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I.    Introduction 
 
Small drones—”microdrones”—are taking the United States by storm.  
Thousands, maybe tens of thousands, of people are buying them on ecommerce 
sites and trying them out.  They are not hard to fly in benign environments.  
They can take off with the push of a button, hover automatically when the 
controls are released, and automatically return to the launching point when 
something goes wrong. 
In many cases, the purchasers view them merely as high-tech toys.  Many, 
however, discover that their onboard HD video cameras can be astonishingly 
useful in capturing overhead imagery to give real estate marketing packages new 
sparkle, to enable reporters and news photographers to jump cameras into the air 
over a fire, a hostage situation, or a vehicle crash, to allow construction 
contractors to program them to fly back and forth to monitor progress on a 
construction site, to permit public safety personnel to fly a grid to search for a 
fugitive or a missing person; to provide new tools to agricultural insurers to 
check crop damage. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) prefers to call them “small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems”—“sUAS”.  Most everyone else calls them 
“drones.”  Whatever they are called, these new types of air vehicles portend a 
revolution in aviation, making available the fruits of fifty years in research and 
development in automatic control systems, semiconductor miniaturization, 
composite fiber materials, and battery development in packages that cost less 
than a high-end HD television. 
A vexing problem that confronts adopters of any new technology is 
matching the technology with the people who use it.  Although engineers can 
take the latest lab results in structures, miniaturized computing power, navigation 
algorithms, and sensors and turn them into products that have traction in the 
marketplace, they cannot engineer the people.  Operators pretty much come as 
they are.  They can be trained, tested, and granted governmental licenses or 
private certificates of competence, but the limits of their physical capacities and 
mental processing agility is ingrown.  Any good engineer pays close attention to 
this and makes sure that her system design accommodates human limitations.  
Managers know that they must embrace new technology at the right time, 
neither taking on too much risk as early adopters, nor waiting so long that the 
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competition gains an advantage.  They struggle to figure out whether their 
existing workforce can be retrained and redirected to use the new technologies, 
or whether they must recruit new and more flexible talent.  They choose between 
recruiting the best raw talent and molding it or limiting their hiring to those that 
already have proven their capacity.  Is a licensing system in place?  If so, what 
level of licensing must the operator have?  Is an undergraduate college or 
graduate degree necessary?  Can additional training be arranged by contracting 
with specialized schools? 
 Sometimes—as is the case so far with microdrones—innovation struggles 
against governmental restrictions premised, not on the features of the new 
technology, but on risks presented by old technology.  Now, the FAA has 
crossed a bridge by responding to a statutory mandate to integrate microdrones 
into the National Airspace System by 2014.1  On February 15, 2015, it issued a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”)2 that wisely rejected the idea of 
subjecting microdrones to the burdens of traditional aircraft, pilot, and 
operational requirements designed around the risks posed by airplanes and 
helicopters.  Instead it adopts performance standards for DRone OPerators 
(“DROPs”), reinforced by a knowledge test tailored to what they need to know, 
and a simple set of limitations that confine microdrone flight to the proximity of 
the DROP.  The NPRM recognizes that the FAA was fighting a losing battle to 
prohibit commercial operation of microdrones, and that a mismatch between 
regulatory requirements and reality would produce a market in which the 
principal regulator of aviation safety is ignored. 
The NPRM recognizes that microdrones do not fit the regulatory matrix 
developed over the last century for airplanes and helicopters with people on 
board.  It has adopted an approach for matching the people with the technology.  
It concludes that, while microdrones are much simpler to fly than airplanes and 
helicopters because of their computerized controls systems, their DROPs 
nevertheless need to understand the national airspace system, and the ways in 
which manned aircraft maneuver through it.  That leads to the knowledge test 
requirement.3  The FAA wisely has molded the content of the DROP knowledge 
test to the things DROPs need to know, as opposed to the things airplane and 
helicopter pilots need to know to fly hundreds or thousands of miles in varying 
weather, and to deal with emergencies like engine failures leading to glides or 
autorotations. 
While the knowledge test will be developed by the FAA itself and 
administered through the existing network of private testing centers accredited 
by the FAA, the NPRM leaves open the question of how DROP candidates will 
prepare for the knowledge test and acquire the skills necessary to fly their 
 
 1.   FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 112 P.L. 95, 126 Stat. 11 §333 (2012). 
 2.   FAA, OPERATION AND CERTIFICATION OF SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS; 
PROPOSED RULE, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “NPRM”) (an NPRM is the first 
formal step in promulgating federal rules that have the force of law).  
 3.   See id. at 103-07 (discussing need for a knowledge test). 
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microdrones safely.  Implicitly, the NPRM recognizes that a rich array of 
private-sector training, testing, and certification regimes can meet the needs of 
the emerging microdrone community, while protecting the existing aviation 
community and the general public from unsafe operation.  DROPs do not need 
traditional pilot’s licenses to operate safely, but they do need training on the 
particular risks associated with microdrones, especially their automatic control 
systems and wireless control links.  The best way to deliver the training, test 
training results, and certify competence is through a new infrastructure of private 
associations working in conjunction with the FAA, linked to its DROP 
knowledge test. 
While this approach is tailored to new realities, it does not differ materially 
from the long-standing governmental-private partnership that trains, tests, and 
certifies airplane and helicopter pilots.  It focuses the efforts on the problem to be 
solved instead of trying to shoe-horn microdrones into a traditional framework 
that does not fit. 
This article begins, in section II, by describing the features of typical 
microdrones, highlighting the main requirements of the NPRM, and 
emphasizing the validity of the FAA’s rejection of calls to impose a requirement 
that DROPs have a traditional pilot’s license—a requirement the FAA itself had 
insisted upon in its grant of some 25 exemptions from its ban4 and that the Air 
Line Pilots Association had urged be made even tougher.5 
It probes the economic and political factors that will come to bear as the 
FAA and others defend its appropriateness in the NPRM, in section III. 
0The articles then moves, in section IV, to explain that compliance with 
any regulatory regime depends on cultural factors that encourage compliance, 
and argues that FAA regulation of microdrones will be far more effective if a 
community of DROPs emerges resembling the long-standing community of 
aviators.  More than a testing requirement is necessary for that to happen. 
Section V explains why the Delegation doctrine does not prevent an 
administrative agency from giving a significant role to private sector actors in 
implementing a mandatory regulator regime. 
Section VI moves to explain the content of desirable requirements for 
DROPs, beginning with the concept of validation—the need to relate selection 
and certification requirements to specific competencies necessary to reduce risk.   
It works through the major areas of knowledge identified in the NPRM and 
explains why they are necessary, while also justifying the exclusion of other 
skills and knowledge needed by airplane and helicopter pilots but not by 
DROPS. 
 
 4.   Petition for Exemption No. 11138 at 13-16, Douglas Trudeau, Realtor, No. FAA-2014-
0481 (discussing requirement for private pilot’s license requirement and additional microdrone 
training and experience, in grant of section 333 petition).  
 5.  See id. at 9 (describing ALPA’s advocacy of a commercial pilot requirement, in grant of 
section 333 petition).  
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Finally, in section VII, it proposes one or more private associations that 
would develop and deliver DROP skills training programs and certification, 
prepare DROP candidates for the new knowledge test, and work with the FAA 
to refine knowledge testing and other requirements for DROPs. 
To be sure, the growing debate over regulating microdrones—one certain 
to intensify during the comment period on the NPRM—is not limited to a debate 
over DROP training and licensing requirements alone.  It also involves 
consideration of height, range, weight, and geographic limitations expressed in 
operating rules, debate over what features should be required of onboard control 
systems and their ability to operate autonomously to limit the risk of 
irresponsible DROP decisions, and identification and data transmission 
requirements to enhance collision avoidance and enforcement.6  To require a 
$7,000 private pilot certificate,7 or as Airline Pilot’s Association (“ALPA”) 
would prefer, a $40,000-$200,000 commercial certificate,8 to operate a $900 
microdrone over one’s own farm or vacation home is a powerful impediment to 
further deployment of this technology.  It is important that the FAA resist such 
proposals. 
 
 
 6.   See NPRM, supra note 2, at 84 (discussing exclusion from Classes B, C, and D 
airspace); id. at 124-30 (discussing registration and marketing requirements).  
 7.   Pilot Certificate Options and Timeline, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.aopa.org/letsgoflying/ready/time/options.html (last visited on Mar. 20, 2015) (estimating 
total cost of obtaining private pilot’s license as $5,000-$7,000; explaining requirements and 
timelines).  
 8.  The cost of commercial pilot certification varies widely, depending on whether the candidate 
combines the requisite flight training with getting an undergraduate degree.  It costs less, of course, to omit 
the degree.  Then the cost is on the order of $36,000, representing the sum of the cost of a private license 
(say $7,000), the cost of further training for the commercial license (say another $8,000), and the cost of 
flight time to accumulate the required 250 hours (210 hours at $100 per hour, to be added to the 40 hours 
accumulated for the private license.  See, e.g. Commercial Pilot Training - Accelerated Commercial Pilot 
License - Flight Training Course (Single Engine, Initial), SUN STATE AVIATION, http://www.sun 
stateaviation.com/commercial.html (estimating cost of commercial license as $4443 for private pilot with at 
least 240 total time); Commercial Pilot Pricing, TOUCH-N-GOES AVIATION (last visited on Mar. 28,  2015) 
(estimating http://www.touch-n-goes.com/commercial/commercialpilotpricing.html cost of commercial 
license at $7,950 for holder of private license with 250 hours total time).  Undergraduate programs combine 
the cost of flight training with tuition.  See, e.g. Tuition and Estimated Costs: Fall 2014 - Spring 2015, 
EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, http://daytonabeach.erau.edu/ admissions/ estimated-costs/ 
(last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (estimating tuition for degree program as $43,198 per year and flight-student 
costs at an additional $81,000); Tuition and Fees, LEWIS UNIVERSITY, http://www.lewisu.edu/ 
welcome/offices/business/bursar/tuitionrates.htm (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (estimating degree-
program tuition as $13,915 per semester); Aviation Flight Management, B.S., LEWIS UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.lewisu.edu/academics/aviation/flight-management/ (last visited on Mar. 28, 2015) (plus $7,000 
to $8,000 per semester for flight training).  So the cost of a bachelor’s degree and multi-engine commercial 
rating from Lewis University would be about $176,000. 
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This is the third in a series of articles about drones by the co-authors.  The 
first, Drones,9 introduces the subject and explores the technologies that makes 
microdrones so useful and so inexpensive.  It provides an overview of 
technological, economic, political, and regulatory issues that the second article 
and this one explore more deeply.  The second article, Law Abiding Drones,10 
argues that the character of microdrones justifies simplified regulation as 
consumer products, with automated flight control and safety systems that make 
flying them easy, compared with airplanes and helicopters.  This article focuses 
on the question of operator qualifications.  It does not repeat the details of its 
overview of microdrone potential, the subject of the Vanderbilt article, or the 
analysis of microdrone control systems, the subject of the Columbia article.  The 
three articles complement a number of magazine articles written by the co-
authors.11 
 
II.    The Current Market and Regulatory Regime 
 
A.    Microdrone Vehicles 
 
The DJI Phantom12 and its more recently introduced, larger, sibling, the DJI 
Inspire13 are archetypal microdrones.  Both are quadcopters—vehicles that 
produce thrust with four motors at the end of booms that drive rotors.  The thrust 
generated by each rotor is determined by varying the RPM of the motor.  Unlike 
helicopter rotor blades, the blades of the microdrone rotors have fixed pitch. 
 
 9.   17 VANDERBILT J. SC. & TECH. L. 101 (2015). 
 10.   To be published in the COLUMBIA SCI. TECH. L. REV.  
 11.   Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. SC. & TECH. L. 
101) (hereinafter “Perritt & Sprague”). See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Is there 
a drone in your future?, HELIWEB 14 (May 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, 
Drone Dread, ROTOR & WING MAGAZINE 34 (June 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. 
Sprague, But Who’s Going to Fly Them? PROFESSIONAL PILOT 94 (June 2014); Henry H. Perritt, 
Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law and Order in the Skies, THE TECH (MIT student newspaper) 13 (June 
2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Leashing Drones, ROTORCRAFT PRO (July 2014); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, ROTOR & WING MAGAZINE (Sept. 
2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law Abiding Drones: What to Tell 
Clients that Want to Use Drones in Their Business, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Oct., 2014); Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Ready for the Microdrone Races?, NEWSLETTER OF THE RADIO 
TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASSOCIATION (Oct. 29, 2014); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. 
Sprague, Reigning in the Renegades, VERTICAL MAGAZINE (forthcoming Dec./Jan. 2014-2015); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, DOMESTICATING DRONES: THE TECHNOLOGY, LAW, 
AND ECONOMICS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT (Ashgate Publishing, under contract for delivery Oct. 
2015). 
 12.   Phantom 2 Vision+, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus (last visited Mar. 
24, 2015) (summarizing design and performance of DJI Phantom 2+).  
 13.   Inspire 1, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) 
(summarizing design and performance of DJI Inspire).  
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Onboard computers and electrical control circuits on a control board and 
power distribution board determine how much electrical current should be 
delivered to each motor to control its RPM—more current, more RPM.  By 
delivering different levels of current to the different motors, the control system 
adjusts the attitude of the vehicle and permits it hover, climb, descend, fly 
forward, backwards, or sideways. 
Electrical power is delivered to the motors through the power distribution 
board from an 11.1 V, 10,000 milliampere hour lithium polymer battery that has 
sufficient capacity to power flights of 20 minutes to 30 minutes.  The battery also 
delivers electrical power to peripherals, such as a built-in two- or three-axis 
camera gimbal and a camera.  Different models of the Phantom are configured to 
carry a GoPro camera or a built-in DJI camera with similar still photography and 
full-motion video capture capability. 
The Inspire has bigger motors, larger rotors, and thus can carry a greater 
payload, up to and including the popular RED camera used for moviemaking.  It 
also has a larger and more sophisticated gimbal.  Basic microdrone 
configurations like these can carry other types of sensors more useful for 
surveying and also can carry small objects such as advertising banners. 
The control board has GPS receiver and associated computer logic that 
permit these microdrones to determine their position in space and to maintain it 
or to fly a programmed pattern.  The control board also has a magnetometer—an 
electronic compass—a barometric altimeter that measures altitude, and, in the 
case of the Inspire, a downward looking sonar sensor that provides more 
accurate indications of height above the surface.  Finally, the control boards have 
an inertial measurement unit (“IMU”) comprising three accelerometers that 
permit the drone to know its direction of movement and acceleration.  The 
combination of the IMU, the altimeters, and the magnetometer allow the drone 
to know its position even when an adequate GPS signal is unavailable, although 
GPS navigation is more accurate.   
The vehicles have transceivers tuned to the 2.4 and 5.8 GHz bands that 
receive control inputs from the DROP and send them to the control board and 
transmit telemetry data with position, speed, altitude, direction of flight, and 
battery power remaining, and stream the video captured by the camera. 
The control board integrates DROP commands, data from its sensors, and a 
geographic database similar to Google Maps. The control board is also 
programmed to enable automatic hover when no control inputs are being 
received and to return home autonomously in the event of a malfunction, such a 
loss of control-link signal or impending battery exhaustion.  The programs also 
prevent the DROP from flying into controlled airspace or near airports, above a 
certain height, and beyond a specified range.  They also allow the DROP to 
specify a flight path to be flown over the ground by tapping waypoints on a map 
display. 
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The DROP controls the vehicle by moving two joysticks and adjusting 
switches on a small console (“DROPCON”) that can be worn on the strap 
around his neck.  A helicopter pilot flying the drone interprets the left joystick as 
the collective, controlling thrust by upward and downward movement and the 
right joystick as the cyclic, controlling pitch and roll and thereby direction of 
flight.  Yaw is controlled by moving the left joystick left and right. 
The Inspire can accommodate two DROPCONS, one used by the DROP, 
and the other used by a separate photographer who controls the camera and its 
gimbal.  Serious photography missions benefit from having two persons, the 
DROP to fly the vehicle, and the photographer (“photog”) to concentrate on the 
imagery being captured. 
Each DROPCON has a transmitter to send the control signals to the 
vehicle, receivers to acquire the downlink telemetry and video signal, and an 
iPad-Mini-sized LED video display that allows the DROP (and a separate 
photog) to see the imagery captured by the onboard camera. 
Prices for the Phantom range from $700-$1200, depending on whether 
the purchaser supplies her own camera.14  The price for the Inspire is just under 
$3000. 15 
Many competitive alternatives exist, of course, comparable in price and 
performance to the Phantom and Inspire.16  Larger hexacopters and octocopters 
are also available at prices ranging from under $10,000 to about $20,000.17  
These bigger vehicles can carry considerably more payload and, in some cases, 
have significantly greater endurance, up to an hour.18  
 
B.    The FAA Ban and the NPRM 
 
Before the NPRM was released, the FAA took the position that 
commercial flight of drones is illegal unless one obtains an exemption from 
FAR compliance under section 333 of the 2012 Act, registers the drones, and 
also obtains a Civil Certificate of Authority (“COA”) for specific flight 
programs.19  Presumably the ban remains in effect—at least in principle—until 
 
 14.   Phantom 2 Vision+ V3.0, DJI, https://store.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus?position=1 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (quoting prices for various models of Phantom).  
 15.   Inspire 1 & Accessories, DJI, https://store.dji.com/inspire-1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (quoting 
price for Inspire 1).  
 16.   IRIS+, 3D ROBOTICS INC., http://3drobotics.com (last visited  Mar. 24, 2015).  
 17.  The CineStar H8L is an example.  See CineStar 8, FREEFLY SYSTEMS, http://freeflysystems.com/ 
products/cinestar/8 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) 
 18.   Walkera QR X800 Pro Film Quadcopter, EPFILMS, http://epfilms.tv/walkera-qr-x800-review-
best-aerial-filming/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (reviewing 8.6 pound multicopter claiming up to one hour 
of endurance). 
 19.  See, e.g., Section 333, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.faa.gov/uas/ 
legislative_programs/section_333/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (FAA guidance on seeking Section 
333 expemptions for microdrones); Documents relating to Docket CP-217: Huerta v. Pirker, 
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, http://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/Pages/pirker.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (reversing ALJ decision and reinstating FAA ban). 
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the NPRM completes the comment process and emerges as a final rule.  This, 
however, is unlikely to occur until 2016 or early 2017. 
The FAA does, however, have discretion as to when it commences 
enforcement proceedings, discretion that it has used for years to leave model 
aircrafts alone,20 even though their flight arguably requires compliance with all 
the Federal Aviation Regulations’ (“FARs”) for airworthiness certification, 
pilots’ licenses, and compliance with operating rules designed for airplanes and 
helicopters.21  It would be good policy to exercise this discretion not to enforce 
the theoretical ban against DROPs who fly in conformity with the NPRM 
while it is being finalized.  This would include obtaining certification from a 
private association that they have passed a knowledge test based on the 
NPRM’s proposal. 
 
C.    The Private Pilot Requirement 
 
In all of the 24 Section 333 exemptions granted as of early 2015, the 
FAA consistently insisted on at least a private pilot’s license for DROPs.22  
It rejected arguments from ALPA that a commercial pilot’s license should 
be required,23 and also rejected proposals by some of the petitioners that 
less should be required, such as completion of a manufacturer or operator 
provided training program, or satisfactory completion of the private pilot 
knowledge test without having to satisfy the flight proficiency requirement.24  
There is every reason to expect that ALPA and others preferring high barriers 
to entry for microdrones will urge the FAA to modify the NPRM to reinstate a 
conventional pilot’s license requirement. 
As the NPRM recognizes,25 requiring a private (or commercial) pilot’s 
license is not an appropriate way to reduce risks associated with commercial 
microdrone flight.   
 
One thing we know for sure (and via the FAA’s own research) 
Predator pilots with conventional licenses make more mistakes 
than Army operators without a pilot’s license in flying their  
 
 20.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 45-48 (discussing  model aircraft regulation historically and under 
proposed rule). 
 21.   See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21-121 (2010). 
22   22.    Drone Laws Blog, All FAA Grant of Exemptions Under Section 333, ANTONELLI LAW 
http://dronelawsblog.com/faa-grant-exemptions-section-333/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) 
 23.  FAA, Grant of Exemption to Helinet Aviation Services, LLC, Exemption No. 11160, 
FAA Docket No. 2014-0785 at 3-5 (Feb. 2, 2015) (discussing ALPA objections to petition). 
 24.  Compare FAA, In the matter of Trimble Navigation Ltd., Exemption No. 11110, FAA Docket 
No. 2014-0367 at 7 (grant of exemption Dec.10, 2014) (proposing no pilot-license requirement) with id. at 
15 (imposing private-pilot requirement). 
 25.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 99-107 (explaining why traditional pilot’s license should not 
be required). 
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UAVs,’ says Missy Cummins, who teaches courses about drones 
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Duke University. 
So making everyone get a license does nothing to improve safety.26 
 
To evaluate that position, one needs to know what is necessary to get a 
private pilot’s license. 
An applicant for a private pilot’s license must complete at least 40 
hours of flight time, including 20 hours of dual instruction27 from a 
certificated flight instructor (“CFI”)28 and undergo an adequate amount of 
ground instruction29 to permit him to pass both a written (“knowledge”) test 
and a Check Ride— the “practical test.”  The knowledge test is designed by 
the FAA and administered by private test centers designated by the FAA.30  
Check Rides are conducted by FAA inspectors or by designated pilot 
examiners (“DPEs”)—CFIs specifically selected by the FAA to perform 
these delegated roles.31  Candidates may not take the knowledge exam or 
the practical test until they are  endorsed for both by their flight instructor.32 
Specific knowledge and skills requirements are considered in sections VI 
and VII.A, which consider the relevance of these requirements for certification 
of DROPs. 
Costs for obtaining a private pilot’s license range from $6000—
$10,000,33 depending on the rate at which a candidate progresses.  Instructors 
usually teach through flight schools, which range from small one to four-
person operations to larger and more formal operations accredited by the FAA 
under Part 141.34  Flight schools include aeronautical universities such as 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,35 Lewis University,36 and Hillsboro 
Aero Academy. 37 
 
 26.   Jonathan Berr, Why Amazon’s drone delivery service is a long way away, CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 
2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-amazons-drone-delivery-service-is-a-long-ways-away/. 
 27.   14 C.F.R. § 61.109(a) (2010) (airplane); 14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2010) (helicopter). 
 28.  14 C.F.R. § 61.193 (2009) (describing privileges of CFI).  An “authorized instructor” 
includes a CFI, and a ground instructor for ground training.  14 C.F.R. § 61.1(b) (2015) (defining 
“authorized instructor”). 
 29.   14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (2013). 
 30.  Pilot Testing, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, https://www.faa.gov/pilots/testing/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2015) (describing content of knowledge tests and knowledge test centers). 
 31.  14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE). 
 32.  14 C.F.R. § 61.35(a)(1) (2013) (requiring instructor endorsement of preparedness for 
knowledge test). 
 33.  See NPRM, supra note 2 (calculating cost of private pilot’s certificate); 14 C.F.R. § 
61.39(a)(6) (2015) (requiring instructor endorsement of preparedness for practical test). 
 34.  See 14 C.F.R. § 141 (2013) (FAA-approved flight schools). 
 35.   EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, http://www.erau.edu/ (last visited Mar. 
24, 2015). 
 36.   Unmanned Aircraft Systems, B.S., LEWIS UNIVERSITY, http://www.lewisu.edu/academics/ 
unmanned-aircraft-systems/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 37.   About Us, HILLSBORO AERO ACADEMY, http://www.flyhaa.com/en/page/school (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
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III.    Economics and Politics 
 
In a truly rational world, licensing would be tightly integrated with the 
knowledge and skills required to perform the tasks of the occupation.  That 
would, as section VI.A explains, require ongoing validation analysis and 
testing of the power of each licensing requirement to reduce one or more 
discrete risks experienced in the operating environment.  Stall-prevention and 
recovery is practiced in flight training to reduce the obvious risks associated 
with stalling and losing control of an airplane.  Practice autorotation is part of 
the helicopter training to ensure that rotor RPM does not decay so much 
after an engine failure that the helicopter loses the capacity to generate lift. 
Conversely, the FAA recognized, in early 2015, that knowledge testing on 
automatic direction finding using ADF equipment makes little sense, because 
few aircraft are equipped with ADF now, most ADF ground stations have been 
phased out, and ADF has been replaced by newer technologies for navigation.38 
That is not, however, how most licensing decisions in a market-oriented 
economy and democratic political system are made.  Rather, new licensing 
requirements are imposed by legislatures and administrative agencies based on 
a combination of experience-based instincts, mass political reaction to highly 
publicized mishaps, and efforts by existing occupants of the field to limit 
competition. 
The likelihood of a close coupling between training and licensing 
requirements and operational reality is increased when practitioners are involved 
in defining and administering the requirements.  In that respect, it is worth 
noting that almost everyone who participates in the flight training process for 
would-be pilots is himself a pilot, as often as not one involved in flying for a 
living in operations beyond flight training.  Similarly, substantial fractions of 
the faculty in medical schools are comprised of practicing physicians.  Law 
schools are much criticized, on the other hand, because of the relatively thin 
involvement of legal practitioners in determining the content of legal 
education, which is mostly designed by full-time, research-oriented, academics, 
who have left the practice behind—or who never had practice experience. 
Involvement from active practitioners in setting and enforcing licensing 
standards, however, increases the likelihood of industry capture.  Industry 
capture distorts the content of licensing requirements by simply making them 
the highest possible barriers to entry.  The literature on occupational licensing 
suggests a variety of approaches to mitigate the risk of turning licensing 
regimes into cartels, but the best approach across the board is to insist that the 
 
 38.   Dan Namowitz, Goodbye NDB and other outdated test questions, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND 
PILOTS ASSOCIATION (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.aopa.org/News-and-Video/All-News/2015/January/ 
29/FAA-posts-positive-airman-testing-changes-on-web-site (discussing removal of ADF questions 
from knowledge test). 
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proponents or defenders of licensing regimes and their training components 
demonstrate the validity of each basic requirement, in terms of its relationship 
to an operational risk.  The analytical process is not unlike that imposed under 
Title VII on employer testing and job requirements. 
There is little evidence of large-scale anticompetitive behavior in the 
aviation labor market yet.39  To be sure, collective-bargaining agreements 
for pilots protect the job security and compensation arrangements for existing 
pilots from competitive pressures from new entrants.  It is true that the 
1500 hour requirement and the toughening of ATP knowledge testing 
ratchets up the barriers to entry by new pilots, but the evidence that existing 
pilot organizations pushed for these changes is thin. 
In any event, advocacy of toughened requirements for pilot qualification 
almost always can be justified, as in so many other fields, by the enhanced 
safety that will result from the tougher requirements.  Pilot groups such as the 
ALPA40 and the agricultural pilots association have been advocating that 
microdrones be operated only by persons possessing traditional pilots 
licenses.41  They justify their position based on arguments that requiring a 
pilot’s license will enhance safety of microdrone flight.42  It is also true, 
however, that the more demanding the requirements for microdrone operation 
are, the less of a threat they present to established manned aircraft operations 
and pilot jobs.  The purpose of the advocacy may or may not be 
anticompetitive, but the effect certainly is.  The balance between genuine 
safety concerns and anticompetitive efforts can be evaluated by the rigor with 
which the advocates of DROP licensing link specific licensing requirements to 
specific microdrone flight risks.  The groups have not done much of that yet. 
Furthermore, the credibility of a concern that more drones mean fewer 
airline pilot jobs or fewer helicopter charters is low.  The putative 
anticompetitive instinct would come more from a loose sense of association 
with the pilot community in general, and a concern that, somewhere, in 
some part of the industry, drones might result in less demand for manned 
aircraft and therefore pilots. 
 
 39.   But see Jack Nicas, Man vs Drone: Some Pilots Fight Back Against Robots, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
15, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/man-vs-drone-some-pilots-fight-back-against-robots-1421347663 
(quoting pilots who fear commercial competition from microdrones and sought private-pilot requirement 
in order to limit competition). 
 40.   Federal Aviation Administration. Exemption No. 11160, Docket No. FAA-2014-0785 
(Feb. 2, 2015) at 4 (FAA letter describing ALPA position that a commercial pilot certificate 
should be required). 
 41.   Id. at 5 (describing NAAA opposition to petition). 
 42.   Id. at 4 (quoting NAAA opposition to petition commenting that, “Just as manned aircraft pilots 
are required to undergo a rigorous training curriculum and show that they are fit to operate a commercial 
aircraft, so too must UAS operators.  Holding a commercial certificate holds UAS operators to similar high 
standards as commercial aircraft operators and ensures they are aware of their responsibilities as 
commercial operators within the NAS.  Medical requirements ensure they have the necessary visual and 
mental acuity to operate a commercial aircraft repeatedly over a sustained period of time.”) 
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The alarmist argument, regularly advanced by ALPA, that a 
microdrone strike could bring down a 747 is nonsense.  In order to be 
certified by the FAA, turbine engines for air transport aircraft must satisfy 
bird-ingestion tests.43  The engines for the 747 and 787 must withstand 
ingestion of an eight-pound bird.44  A DJI Phantom weighs 2.6 pounds, and 
a DJI Inspire weighs 6.4 pounds.45  The Cinestar 8HL weighs 6.72 
pounds.46 
Moreover, most bird strikes are not catastrophic to engine operation: 
“By far, most bird encounters do not affect the safe outcome of a 
flight.  In more than half of the bird ingestions into engines, the flight crew 
is not even aware that the ingestion took place.”47 
Their incidence suggests that microdrone/manned-aircraft collisions 
would be unlikely: 
 
The extreme rarity of any collisions between birds and aircraft 
away from airports and at low altitude, despite the population 
of 10 billion birds, suggests that unintentional impact between 
UAVs and manned aircraft away from airports and low 
altitude will always remain extremely unlikely.48 
 
IV.    Dynamics of Compliance 
 
Governments may adopt rules, but that does not necessarily alter 
behavior.  Prohibition and the war against drugs—particularly as it concerns 
recreational marijuana use—come to mind.  Whether the targets of the rules 
comply with them depends on how well the rules fit the economic 
 
 43.  14 C.F.R. § 33.76(b) (2007) (requiring test with “large single bird” aimed at the most critical 
exposed location on the first stage rotor blades at a bird speed of 200 knots; requiring bird weights of 4-
8 pounds, depending on engine inlet throat area).  See also FAA Advisory Circular: Bird Ingestion 
Certification Standards, AC No. 33.76-1A (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ 
Advisory_ Circular/AC%2033.76-1A.pdf. 
 44.   The GEnx engine used for the Boeing 787 and the 747-8 has a fan diameter of 111 
inches for the 787 and 105 inches for the 747-8.  This produces an engine inlet throat area of 
9676.88 square inches for the 787 and 8364.67 square inches for the 747-8.  An eight-pound bird 
is required to certify these engines.  14 C.F.R. § 33.76 (2007), Table 1 (requiring tests with bird 
weight 8.03 pounds for engine inlet throat area greater than 6,045 square inches). 
45 45.     See Phantom 2 Vision+ Specs, DJI, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom-2-vision-plus/spec (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2015) and Inspire 1 Specs, DJI http://www.dji.com/product/inspire-1/spec (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2015). 
46  46.     See CineStar-8 MK Heavy Lift RTF, QUDROCOPTER http://www.quadrocopter.com/CineStar-
8-MK-Heavy- Lift-RTF_p_1156.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2015)  
 47.   Airplane Turbofan Engine Operation and Malfunctions Basic Familiarization for 
Flight Crews, Federal Aviation Administration, 23, https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_ 
approvals/engine_prop/media/engine_malf_famil.doc. 
 48.   UAS Safety Analysis, EXPONENT 7 (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.uasamericafund.com/ 
assets/micro-uav-safety-analysis.pdf (hereinafter “MIT Bird Study”). 
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circumstances of the targets, on whether informal behavioral norms of relevant 
groups encourage or discourage compliance, on the level of sanctions for 
noncompliance, and on the resources available to detect and punish 
noncompliance.49  If, as many people believe,50 drone operation should be 
regulated, and only persons with the requisite skills and safety orientation 
should be allowed to fly them, regulatory designers must pay attention to the 
logical relationship between rule content and verifiable risks.  They also must 
understand the extralegal forces that can encourage compliance and work to 
mobilize those forces. 
In many areas of human activity, actors adhere to norms that are not 
codified in law.  Aviation is a prominent example.51  Going to the back of the 
line in a grocery store or an airport boarding area are examples within almost 
everyone’s experience.  In other cases, these informal behavioral patterns have 
been translated into legal rules.  In still other cases, a combination of legal 
mandates and prohibitions and private networks that encourage compliance and 
actually enforce them have grown up together.  Aviation regulation, qualification 
of lawyers, physicians, and accountants are prominent examples of interrelated 
governmental and private forces.  There are many other, examples as well. 
Although economists identify a number of reasons why large groups 
are incapable of self-governance without intervention by legal obligation,52 
small groups, many quite informal, regularly govern themselves.  “Most 
social order is not created by the State.  There exists a vast ocean of social 
rules completely untouched by formal law.”53 
Sociology teaches that repeated interaction stimulates the creation and 
enforcement of social norms and compliance with them.54  Governments may 
help create the preconditions by “yoking actors together into relationships of 
 
      49.    See infra, note 53. 
 50.  Ipsos Poll Conducted for Reuters, IPSOS (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.ipsos-na.com/ 
download/pr.aspx?id=14209 (reporting 42% oppose private ownership of drones). 
 51.   See, e.g. Geoff Goodyear, Focus on Safety: Experience Acquired at the Speed of Light, 
VERTICAL MAGAZINE, Feb/Mar. 2015 (reviewing basic safety practices); Pilots Resources: Air Safety 
Institute, AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, http://www.aopa.org/Pilot-Resources/Air-
Safety-Institute (describing safety resources available to pilots through pilots’ organization). 
 52.   See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 53.   Bryan H. Druzin, Planting Seeds of Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use 
Customary Law, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 375 (2014) [hereinafter Druzin]. See also Lawrence 
Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Ryan Goodman, Beyond the 
Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 
643, 643 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 
(1996); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 
(1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 346-47 (1997). 
 54.   Druzin, supra 52, at 377-378. 
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repeated interaction through establishing legal obligations between them that 
will ensure this repetition.”55  Bryan Druzin offers the hypothetical example of 
the laws requiring the members of a small group to help one of their members 
prepare daily meals.56  The resulting interaction will give rise to various 
informal rules guiding participation and sanctions for shirking.57  He also 
offers as an example the emergence of the medieval Law Merchant, a series of 
customs that governed commercial interaction in business communities before 
commercial law emerged.58  The state encourages such private arrangements 
simply by making private contracts enforceable through state institutions.59  He 
offers some practical examples of how the state could engineer private 
governance: 
 
If the State considered it in the public interest that everyone take 
better care of their front yards, rather than concocting intricate 
laws requiring people to do so (something that would require 
unrealistic levels of monitoring and enforcement), the State could 
adopt the more deft approach of customary law cultivation.  The 
State could harness the self-ordering potential of repeated 
interaction by requiring, for example, that the residents of a street 
collectively tend to one of the yards on the street each Sunday 
(the yard to be tended would change each week to ensure 
reciprocity).  Non-compliance would be subject to a small fine.  
Instead of fabricating and enforcing a complex system of 
regulation, the State could simply impose a single legal 
obligation yet one that deliberately comprises an ongoing 
positive duty so as to bring private parties together into 
relationships of repeated interaction.60 
 
In support of this hypothetical arrangement, he offers the example of 
“barn raising” in some rural communities: a phenomenon in which members of 
the community came together to help one member build a barn, supported by 
the expectation that the beneficiary would reciprocate.61 
In the context of DROP certification, the FAA could play a similar 
role. The NPRM’s testing requirement encourages a would-be DROP to be 
a member of an association similar to the American Association of Drone 
Instructors (“AADI”)62 and to obtain certification through the association. 
 
 
 55.    Id. at 378. 
56        56.      Id.  
 57.   Id. 388-390. 
 58.   Id. at 390. 
 59.   Druzin, supra 52, at 392. 
 60.   Id. at 397. 
 61.   Id. at 399. 
 62.   See § C (describing proposed association of drone instructors). 
PERRITT_DROP_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2015  5:02 PM 
158 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:2 
V.    Delegation 
 
The idea of a private association working with the FAA to implement 
the NPRM does not involve handing off governmental authority to private 
actors. 
Democratic political theory and the pragmatism of the administrative 
state collide when elected legislatures cede too much of their power to 
unelected administrative agencies or to private entities.  The anti-delegation 
doctrine, rooted in the United States Constitution’s separation of powers 
imposes limits on delegation of power by the United States Congress.  In 
Panama Refining Company63 and Schechter Poultry,64 the United States 
Supreme Court struck down significant features of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act.65  Congress had given up too much of its legislative power, 
the court said, by delegating rulemaking authority to a combination the 
National Recovery Administration, a federal agency, and private industry 
groups.66  The particular action challenged in the Schechter litigation was 
the adoption, as a mandatory federal fair-competition-code, of live poultry 
codes developed by an industry association, which also was given 
administration and criminal enforcement responsibility.67  Giving legislative 
power to private citizens and entities provided even less political accountability 
than giving it to agencies with an executive branch, the court reasoned.68 
 
[W]ould it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its 
legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so 
as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and 
beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or 
industries?  Could trade or industrial associations or groups be 
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such 
associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their 
enterprises?  And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such 
a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in 
section 1 of title 1?  The answer is obvious.  Such a delegation of 
legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent 
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.69 
 
 63.   Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating, as overbroad, 
delegation of power to President to prohibit interstate transportation of “hot oil”—oil produced in 
excess of state quotas). 
 64.   A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 65.   Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196. 
66   65.      See Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) and  A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 67.   A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 524-526 (describing code, its origin, and the 
indictment of the challenger for violating it). 
68   67.     Id. at 537. 
 69.  Id.  
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Although some commentators viewed the delegation doctrine as 
essentially obsolete,70 the Supreme Court regularly used it to scrutinize 
statutory empowerment of administrative agencies.71  As recently as 2013, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit used the delegation 
doctrine to invalidate a statute empowering Amtrak—a private, albeit 
government chartered—corporation to set performance standards for railroads, 
in conjunction with Department of Transportation:72 
“Federal lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory authority to a private 
entity. To do so would be legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form.”73 
Accordingly, the force of the delegation doctrine is not so much that it 
regularly results in judicial invalidation of regulatory schemes as that it 
influences the design of such schemes, as legislation is being written.  Apart 
from the responsibility of Congress, as well as the other two branches to honor 
the Constitution, there is no point in enacting legislation that will be struck 
down as unconstitutional. 
But withstanding the delegation doctrine, Congress regularly gives 
substantial rulemaking authority to agencies, sometimes mandating that agencies 
adopt as governmental rules standards of conduct and performance developed 
initially by private bodies such as standard-setting organizations.74  This is 
constitutional, so long as Congress “channels” agency rulemaking power by 
sufficiently specific criteria to limit its exercise.  The legislative standards must 
be sufficiently specific to permit Article III courts to ascertain whether the 
agency has stayed within its delegated powers.75 
 
 
 
 
 70.   See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)(observing 
that statutes have been invalidated under delegation doctrine only twice in U.S. history). 
 71.   See Mistretta (upholding statute establishing federal Sentencing Commission); 
Whitman v American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (recognizing viability of 
delegation doctrine but rejecting delegation-doctrine challenge to EPA authority to set pollution 
limits). 
 72.   See Association of American Railroads v. United States Department of Transportation, 
721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declaring statute unconstitutional), rev’d, Department of 
Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225 (2015) (remanding for 
determination of whether delegation doctrine permitted Amtrak to participate in setting standards 
for passenger train performance). 
 73.   Ass’n of American Railroads, 721 F.3d at 670 (internal quotations omitted). 
 74. Updating OSHA Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Head Protection, 77 
Fed. Reg. 121 (Dep’t of Labor June 22, 2012) (proposed rules) available at https://www.osha.gov/ 
pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGISTER&p_id=23039  (showing 
national consensus standards incorporated into OSHA regulations through a table). 
 75.   American Ass’n of Railroads, 721 F.3d at 670 (observing that delegation to 
administrative agency can survive delegation-doctrine challenge if an “intelligible principle” in 
the statute constrains agency legislative power). 
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Governmental rules derived from private sector standards of behavior are 
quite common.  Even more common are rules developed based largely or entirely 
on private industry recommendations delivered through formal advisory 
committees or otherwise.76  Indeed, the FAA traditionally has used such a process 
for developing most of its rules for airworthiness certification, operating rules, and 
pilot licensing.77 
The FAA also relies on private individuals to implement and enforce its 
rules. Most of the detailed testing and inspection of an aircraft as part of the 
airworthiness certification process is performed, not by government employees, 
but by private manufacturers applying accredited processes.78  Most flight tests 
for pilot’s licenses are conducted, not by government employees, but by 
Designated Pilot Examiners (“DPEs”).79  Virtually all medical examinations for 
pilot certification are conducted by private physicians.80  Many control towers at 
smaller airports are staffed, not by federally employed air traffic controllers, but 
by private contractors performing the same functions.81 
These arrangements that involve broad delegation of rulemaking and 
rule-enforcement power by Congress initially to the FAA, and then to 
private sector decision-makers are widely accepted.  It is difficult to find 
any argument that such an arrangement violates the delegation doctrine.82 
There is no reason that mixed public/private mechanisms for drone 
regulation would be any more vulnerable to constitutional scrutiny. 
But the realities of the microdrone marketplace and the context within 
which thousands of air vehicles will operate militate toward an even greater 
reliance on private entities for developing regulations and training of DROPs.  
The delegation doctrine may achieve increased prominence in shaping 
regulatory alternatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 76.  FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT (FACA) MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW, G.S.A. 
http://www.gsa.gov/ portal/content/104514. (last updated Apr. 20, 2015) 
 77.   ADVISORY AND RULEMAKING COMMITTEES, FAA (2015) available at http://www.faa.gov 
/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/. (“We develop regulations using committees that 
include members of the aviation community and the FAA”).  
 78.  Production Certificate Application and Approval Process, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Aug. 6, 2014, 
2:01 pm). http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/production_approvals/prod_cert/prod_approv_proc/(describing 
FAA approval and audit of manufacturer processes). 
 79.   14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE). 
 80.   14 C.F.R. §§ 67.405, 67.407 (2008) (describing examining physicians) 
 81.   See U.S. Contract Tower Ass’n., (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) http://www.contracttower.org/ 
(describing contract-tower program). 
 82.   A Westlaw search on February 3, 2015 by co-author Perritt with the search term 
“delegation doctrine FAA private” produced no hits. 
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Already, the FAA has made suggestions83 that recreational and hobbyist 
flight should be governed as a matter of law by model airplane association 
guidelines.84  Under such suggestions, the private organization not only would 
develop the rules; they would enforce them by its membership expulsion power 
and a governmental regulatory probation against microdrone flight unless by one 
who is a member of the organization.85 
That is not what the NPRM envisions; rather under it, the FAA retains the 
authority to make the rules and to prescribe the content of DROP tests. This 
follows the agency’s longstanding practice for pilot certification.  The FARs 
prescribe certain subjects that must be covered by flight training programs,86 but 
the flight training programs themselves, stage testing, and certification of 
readiness for certain steps in the certification process, such as taking a 
knowledge test87 or taking a practical test (checkride)88 are done by private CFIs.  
We have no particular objection to it, but it’s stylistically odd.  The details of the 
curriculum flow from the FAA practical test standards, but are fleshed out by 
private flight schools, only some of which, under Part 141, are accredited by the 
FAA,89 requiring their training materials, including instructional syllabi, to be 
approved in advance by the FAA.90  The proliferation of microdrones 
necessitates a decentralized approach that relies more on private entities.  For 
example, the law-abiding drone approach recommended by the authors of this 
article,91 would, in some implementations, vest microdrone vendors with the 
responsibility of designing training programs and certifying satisfactory 
completion by DROPs. 
 
 
 
 83.   Fed. Aviation Admin., Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, Docket No. 
FAA-2014-0396 (June 18, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf at 11-12 
(explaining requirement that model aircraft be operated within guidelines established by national 
community model aircraft associations). 
 84.   The model aircraft community has vociferously opposed the guidance.  See AMA’s Response 
to the FAA Interpretative Rule, ACADMEY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) 
http://www.modelaircraft.org /aboutama/ AMAInterpretiveRuleResponse.aspx . 
 85.   See  Membership Manual 2015, Article V, ACADEMY OF MODEL AERONAUTICS (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2015) http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/memanual.pdf (providing for expulsion of member for 
violating association rules). 
 86.   14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2010) (specifying subjects of instruction). 
 87.   14 C.F.R. § 61.35(a)(1) (2013) (CFI endorsement for knowledge test). 
 88.   14 C.F.R. § 61.39(a)(6) (2013) (CFI endorsement for practical test). 
 89.   14 C.F.R. § 141.5 (2010) (requirements for approval). 
 90.   14 C.F.R. § 141.55(a)-(e) (2011) (requirements for approval of materials). 
 91.   Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Seeking Law Abiding Drones: What to Tell 
Clients that Want to Use Drones in Their Business, BUSINESS LAW TODAY, Oct., 2014 at 2; 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Reining in the Renegades, VERTICAL MAGAZINE 
(Dec./Jan. 2014-2015). 
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VI.    Content of Requirements 
 
The NPRM sets forth the elements of knowledge that would be tested 
before one could be certified as a DROP.  Those are summarized in section 
VII.A.1.  Evaluating the content of these requirements should proceed from the 
need to assess the nexus between any training and certification requirements 
and the risks they are intended to mitigate—a process known to psychologists 
as “validation.”92 
The following section explains the validation concept and then applies it 
to the set of knowledge and skills that DROPs should possess, compared to the 
set of knowledge and skills needed by pilots of airplanes and helicopters. 
In the NPRM the FAA embraced the idea of this kind of validation 
analysis: 
The NPRM refers to a pre-NPRM petition submitted by the UAS 
America Fund that allows operation of microdrones weighing less than three 
pounds without requiring a conventional pilot’s license.93  The petition is the 
first of a series planned by the UAS America Fund advocating a segmented 
approach, based on aircraft size.94  The NPRM invites comment on the 
segmented approach.95 
The NPRM aligns the FAA with the UAV America Fund’s position that 
existing private or commercial licenses are not the appropriate mechanism for 
assuring DROP qualification:96 
 
[T]he private pilot and commercial pilot certificates currently 
available involve substantial expense and hours of time learning 
actual flying skills within a passenger aircraft cockpit, but those 
skills do not have relevance to UAS operations, particularly for 
the micro UA category.  Micro UA are operated from the ground, 
looking up.  Skills learned inside an aircraft cockpit including 
those for in-flight maneuvers, aircraft systems, emergency 
procedures, and navigation are of minimal utility but impose 
significant burdens.  The financial burden associated with micro 
UA pilots obtaining and maintaining a private pilot or 
commercial license would significantly impact business 
operations and will drastically reduce profits expected when 
forming a business, with no measurable benefit.  There also will 
be a substantial burden on the FAA in issuing and maintaining 
pilot records for UA operators who will never fly a manned 
aircraft.97 
 
92   91.      Test Validity, WIKIPEDIA, (last visited Apr. 19, 2015).  
 93.   Petition of UAS American Fund, LLC to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement 
Operational Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Docket No. FAA-2014-1087-
0001 at 7-8 (filed Dec. 18, 2014) (petitioning for direct rulemaking rather than NPRM). 
 94.   Id. at 4. 
 95.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 52-54 (reporting earlier consideration of segmented approach 
and inviting comment). 
 96.   Id. at 11-13. 
 97.   Id. at pp.13-14. 
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Defining the knowledge and skills a DROP needs to fly a microdrone 
safely is but a specific instance of a more general challenge: understanding the 
implications of human/machine interaction as machines grow more intelligent 
and agile.  Specifying necessary knowledge and physical motor skills is quite 
different for one operating a conventional bulldozer or construction crane, 
compared with the requirements for safe operation of an assembly line robot.  
Similarly, the skills necessary to make mathematical calculations on a slide 
rule are quite different from those required to operate a sophisticated electronic 
calculator or to use mathematics application software.  The important 
judgment required to operate microdrones are quite different from those 
necessary to operate an airplane or helicopter, although the overlap increases as 
automation intensifies.  The old emphasis on motor memory is marginalized 
by a new need how to use computer interfaces and how to deal with computer 
malfunctions. 
The training and testing content requirements developed in the section 
can be imposed by regulation at the federal or state level; they can become 
an outline for detailed syllabi developed by flight schools; and they can 
form the core private certification as discussed in section VII.C.  
 
A.    Validation 
 
The FAA has committed itself to risk-based analysis.98  The NPRM 
reiterates that commitment and delivers on it.  Risk-based regulation requires 
validation of regulatory requirements, establishing a nexus between each 
requirement and the risks it is intended to reduce. 
Validation of occupational requirements is common in other fields. 
For example, the validation approach has called into question physical 
strength and agility requirements for public safety officers.99 
 
For instance, two federal courts have relied on the following 
‘expert’ view of the differences between men’s and women’s 
physical abilities to justify sex-segregated physical activity for 
males and females: 
 
[M]en are taller than women; stronger than women by 
reason of their greater muscle mass; have larger hearts 
than women and a deeper breathing capacity, enabling 
them to utilize oxygen more efficiently than women; 
 
 98.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 34 (characterizing approach as “data-driven, risk-based”). 
 99.   See Ruth Colker, Rank-Order Physical Abilities Selection Devices for Traditionally 
Male Occupations as Gender-Based Employment Discrimination, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761 
(1986). 
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run faster, based upon the construction of the pelvic area, 
which, when women reach puberty, widens, causing the 
femur to bend outward, rendering the female incapable of 
running as efficiently as a male. 
 
Not only do courts exaggerate the differences between men and 
women, implying for instance that no woman could run as fast as 
any man, but they consider only those physical traits traditionally 
valued by men.  Yet, as commentator Lyn Lemaire noted, ‘the 
importance of brute strength in many athletic activities is 
overrated. . . .’  As this Article will explore, the emphasis on 
male physical traits prevails in the selection of firefighters and 
police officers.100 
 
Ruth Colker urged greater scrutiny of actual job requirements rather 
than assumptions based on stereotypes.101 
In Harless,102 the Sixth Circuit recognized that a valid job analysis for 
a physical abilities test must focus on the physical demands of the job.  The 
court found that the Toledo Police Department had never conducted a job 
analysis to determine the amount of physical strength or extent of physical 
exertion required for the job; instead, as the court found, the sole 
justification for the examination was the wholly inadequate ‘intuition’ of 
department officials.103 
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,104 the Supreme Court held tests 
administered by employers as part of the hiring process must be linked to 
the ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs.105  The authoritative 
guidance on validation in the employment context is the EEOC’s Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.106 
 Insisting on validation has utility outside the purely physical context.  
A Harvard law professor, writing in 1982,107 proposed applying it to 
selection of law firm associates.  She reviewed the traditional emphasis on  
law school pedigree and law school grades and the traditional justification 
that these criteria predict future performance as a lawyer.108  She argued 
that these are poor predictors: 
 
 100.   Colker, supra note 98, at 771.  
 101.   Colker, supra note 98, at 788-795 (citing Berkman, 536 F. Supp. at 204). 
 102.   619 F.2d at 611 (1980). 
103102.      Id. 
 104.   422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 105.   Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 426-427. 
 106.   29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1978) (describing criterion-related validity study, content validity 
studies, and construct validity study). 
 107.   Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
945 (1982). 
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High grades and attendance at prestigious law schools are, at 
best, imperfect predictors of performance as a lawyer.  Grades, 
for example, are designed to measure abilities that constitute a 
very small segment of the range of abilities involved in effective 
lawyering. Alternative selection schemes might measure 
additional attributes of at least equal importance.  The firm 
might, for example, develop an assessment system that gave far 
less weight to law school examinations and more to performance 
on long-term written projects, trial and appellate advocacy skills, 
ability to work well with colleagues on cooperative projects, and 
qualities of aggressiveness, energy, and dedication to work.109 
 
Pilot certification requirements enjoy a measure of validation absent from 
most other occupational licensing.  The National Transportation Safety Board 
(“NTSB”) investigates accidents and writes detailed reports on the serious 
ones.  Its accident reports usually contain recommendations directed to 
operators and often to the FAA.  In its report on the Colgan Airways crash near 
Buffalo,110 for example, the Board made 25 new recommendations for changes 
to FAA operating rules, pilot training rules, and aircraft certification rules.111  
The Congress legislated a response,112 requiring the FAA to implement NTSB 
recommendations regarding flight crewmember training.113  It mandated new 
FAA rules that, among other things radically toughened the requirements for 
Airline Transport Pilot certificates,114 specifically including a total of 1,500 
flight hours.115  The FAA responded with new rules.116 
Furthermore, the credentials pilot employers insist that applicants for pilot 
positions produce certificates and logbooks.  Pilot logbooks show experience 
in performing flight tasks; not grades on flight-school tests.  Law firms do not 
routinely insist on the equivalent of logbooks for law graduates applying for 
associate jobs such as a log demonstrating how many cases the applicant has 
litigated or how many new business entities the applicant has set up. 
 
 108.   Id. at 1024. 
 109.   Id.  
 110.   NTSB, Loss of Control on Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Feb. 12, 2009, NTSB/AAR-
10/01, http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1001.pdf (hereinafter 
“Colgan Air Report”). 
 111.   Colgan Air Report, supra note 109, at 156-159. 
 112.   Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, Public Law 
111-216, 124 Stat. 2348 
 113.   Id. at § 208. 
 114.   Id. at § 217. 
 115.   Id. at § 217(c). 
 116.   78 FED.REG. 66261. 
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Also, pilot hiring decisions are generally based on flying with the 
candidate.  In these pre-hire flights, the operator evaluates a number of pilot 
skills and attributes only some of which are part of formal pre-license training 
and evaluation requirements.  Similarly, law firms, especially through summer 
clerkship programs, evaluate candidate attributes that are not part of law-school 
curriculum or tested on the bar exam. 
The validation question is to what degree these hiring criteria can be 
exported backwards into formal requirements for training and testing. 
The point is not that courts routinely should insist upon Title-VII level 
validation analyses; the point is that the validation concept should inform 
policy judgments about rule content for microdrone operation.  It also may 
be appropriate, if the policy process goes awry in this regard, if drone 
operators were required to have traditional pilot’s licenses, for example, for 
lack of validity justification to signify irrationality and arbitrary-and-
capricious decision-making, obligating a reviewing court to invalidate such 
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act.117  The literature 
suggests that courts hearing challenges to the anticompetitive effect of 
license requirements insist on objective empirical evidence that the content 
of the certification requirements, as applied, actually provides net consumer 
benefits.118 
 
B.    Knowledge 
 
The knowledge elements included in the testing required by the 
NPRM for DROP certification119 honor the validation approach.  Requiring 
a manned aircraft pilot’s license does not; some of the requirements 
overlap, but too many diverge. 
 
1.    Principles of Flight 
 
Microdrone DROPs should understand certain basic principles of physics, 
including the idea that acceleration depends on the net force applied to an 
object divided by its mass, that kinetic energy is one-half times mass times 
velocity squared, and that in collisions or crashes, kinetic energy must be 
absorbed by deformation of materials, including human body parts. 
DROPs need only limited knowledge of aerodynamics, structures, and aircraft 
stability and control.  They should understand: the basics of lift and drag, how 
lift is generated by rotors, how multirotor drones introduce pitch, role, and yaw 
forces by varying thrust asymmetrically, and how thrust varies with RPM. 
 
 117.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 118.   David A. Hyman & Shirley Svorny,  If Professions are Just “Cartels By Another Name” 
What Should we do About it?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 101 at 118. 
 119.   See section 1. 
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They also need to understand the basic functional components of a 
microdrone control system: how the DROPCON transmits DROP control 
inputs through the control link, how the receiver on the drones receives them 
and feeds them into the computer logic of the control board which combines 
them with inputs from the onboard GPS receiver, accelerometers, 
magnetometer, and altimeter and translates them into signals that the power 
distribution board can use to meter electrical current to each motor. 
They should understand the basics of wind, not so much how it is 
produced by meteorological forces, but the fact that airborne aircraft move 
with the wind without experiencing crosswind, headwind, or tailwind.  
Crosswinds, headwinds, and tailwinds exist only with reference to the ground.  
In this context, they should understand and be able to compute wind 
limitations based on arithmetic computation of the microdrone’s maximum 
speed capability, compared with the wind components.  In other words, a drone 
that is capable only of achieving 20 knots will not be able to maintain its position 
over the ground when the wind is blowing from any direction at 25 knots. 
They also should understand the rudiments of autorotation by a variable 
pitch rotor, so that they understand why a fixed pitch multirotor microdrone is 
incapable of autorotation.  Unlike a helicopter pilot, a DROP can do nothing to 
set up an autorotation if the propulsion system fails.  After a power failure, not 
only will the drone’s rotors stop generating lift, causing the drone to fall at its 
terminal velocity; it is likely to tumble because its rotors no longer produce the 
stabilization forces to maintain its orientation. 
DROPs should understand the basics of lithium polymer battery 
chemistry, so that they can anticipate when battery capacity is likely to be 
exhausted, and the risks associated with mishandling batteries. 
Unlike airplane pilots, microdrone DROPs do not need to know the details 
of airplane performance, stability and control, such as the relationship between 
angle of attack and stalls, the dynamics of spins, how control surfaces work by 
changing the camber of an airfoil, or how to calculate weight and balance.  They 
do not need to know the effect of density altitude on aircraft performance.  
Unlike helicopter pilots, they do not need to understand effective translational 
lift, translating tendency, loss of tail rotor effectiveness and the need for anti-
torque control. 
 
2.    FARs, with an Emphasis on Airspace Classification 
 
Unlike airplanes and helicopters, microdrones operate in confined local 
spaces, generally less than 500 feet above the ground, and within the line of 
sight of the DROP not more than about a thousand feet away.  Apart from 
safety guidelines, their performance will not allow them to do much more than 
that; even though some microdrones are capable of flying much higher, 
limitations on control-link range apply to the vertical dimension as well as a 
horizontal one, which also limits height.  
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DROPs, unlike pilots, do not need to master the many parts of the FARs 
that pertain to long-distance flight.  Nor, since line of sight cannot be maintained 
in instrument meterological conditions (“IMC”), do they need to know those 
parts of the FARs that pertain to instrument flight rule (“IFR”) operations.120 
They do, however, need to know preflight and flight planning requirements 
pertinent to a particular operation.  Essentially, there needs to be an 
understanding of obligations to make sure that the aircraft is in flying condition 
before launch, how to select an operating area that minimizes risk, and the flight 
techniques for safe operation within that area.  They must appreciate the need not 
to overfly people, and how they usually can get the imagery they want of people, 
animals, and objects by positioning the drone at an offset angle of about 45° 
rather than flying directly overhead.  They also need to know how airspace is 
defined and the limitations associated with different classes of airspace around 
busier airports, including radio communication requirements.  Finally, they 
should know what to expect of manned aircraft, including the different height 
limitations imposed on airplanes and helicopters, and typical approach and 
departure flight profiles for both types of aircraft. 
 
3.    Radio Communication 
 
Because safe operation of drones depends on the integrity and security of 
the radio frequency (“RF”) links that connect drone with DROP, DROPs 
should have a basic understanding of how RF communication works.  In 
particular, they should understand modulation, signal propagation, encryption, 
and video encoding. 
 
i.    Modulation in General 
 
Communicating information by radio requires that the information be 
superimposed on a carrier signal at the higher frequencies that permit it to be 
propagated through space.  The signal containing the information, whether a 
series of bytes representing control inputs from the DROP to the drone, or video 
transmitted back from the drone to the DROP or an associated photographer, 
varies at a much lower frequency than is necessary for the carrier signal.  
Superimposition of the lower frequency information on the carrier signal is called 
modulation.121  
A carrier signal can be modulated by adjusting its amplitude 
(strength), shifting its frequency slightly, shifting its phase, or a 
combination of all three.  Current modulation techniques use a combination 
to get the highest possible efficiency and noise immunity.  But simpler 
techniques better illustrate the process.  The simplest of all, and therefore 
the first to become a commercial reality is the superimposition of a Morse 
code signal on a carrier, resulting in radiotelegraphy.  In this form of 
modulation, the carrier amplitude is modified by the Morse code signal. 
 
   120.      14 C.F.R. § 91.167-91.193. 
 121.   See generally Modulation, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/Modulation. 
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Morse code represents alphanumeric characters and basic punctuation 
marks by a series of dots and dashes.122  A “P” for example, is represented 
by the pattern dot-dash-dash-got.123  To modulate a carrier so that the P is 
transmitted involves adjusting amplitude crudely, between zero and 
maximum.  Thus transmitting a P involves turning the signal on briefly for 
the dot, turning it off, turning it on for a somewhat longer period to 
represent the first dash, turning it off, and then on again for the same period 
to represent the second dash, turning it off, and then turning it on again 
briefly for the final dot.  Frequency shift keying, developed somewhat later, 
provide better noise immunity.  It involves shifting the carrier frequency 
slightly lower for a dot, slightly higher for a dash, and leaving it alone for 
the spaces. 
When the information comprises changing values, such as speech, 
music, or full motion video in analog, the modulator adjusts the carrier 
amplitude or frequency or both continuously, in step with the value of the 
information signal.  When similar information is encoded digitally, as his 
own mostly the case now with current technology, the modulation of the 
carrier with the zeros and ones of the bits comprising the digitized signal 
take modulator designers back to Morse code days.  The value changes in 
the information signal are vastly greater for a digitized video signal than 
the frequency with which the dots dashes occurred in 1920-era 
radiotelegraphy, but the modulation principles are the same.124 
A principle from automatic control theory known as the Nyquist criterion 
expresses the common-sense idea that a carrier signal cannot be modulated at a 
rate faster than it is changing its self.125  In other words, one cannot modulate a 
1 MHz carrier with a 2 MHz information signal.  In particular, the Nyquist 
sampling criterion126 says that the carrier frequency must be at least twice that 
of the modulating signal.  That means that frequencies for DROP-to-drone 
communication must be higher, in proportion to the rate that information needs 
to be transferred to or from them.  A full-motion video signal in uncompressed 
format requires 2.9 gigabits per second to deliver all the necessary information 
in real time.127  That means that the carrier signal must be at least twice that or 
5.8 Gigahertz.  Some degree of compression is necessary to reduce the 
bandwidth requirements. 
 
    122.      Morse Code, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morse_code  
    123.     Id.  
    124.  See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR AMATUER RADIO, HANDBOOK FOR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 
Ch. 12 (2003) (explaining different modulation techniques). [hereinafter “ARRL Hanbook”] (explaining 
different modulation techniques). 
    125.  Nyquist criterion, WIKIPEDIA (last visited  Apr. 20, 2015), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Nyquist_criterion 
 126.   Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Mar. 23, 2015), http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Nyquist%E2%80%93Shannon_sampling_theorem. 
 127.   Video Bitrate calculation for uncompressed video, STACK OVERFLOW (last visited Mar. 23, 
2015), http://stackoverflow.com/questions/24163432/video-bitrate-calculation-for-uncompressed-video. 
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Another theoretical principle, this one from information theorist 
Claude Shannon at MIT,128 declares that the bandwidth required for a 
signal increases in proportion to the rate the signal transmits information.  
Thus a video signal requires more bandwidth than a Morse code signal. 
The combination of the Nyquist criterion and the Shannon principle 
drives the carrier frequencies necessary for drone RF signals upwards.  
FCC licensing groups them in the 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz bands.129 
 
ii.    Spread Spectrum Modulation 
 
Spread-spectrum technology utilizes brief transmissions of the 
modulated carrier on each of several frequencies, as many as 100 in some 
implementations.130  It was developed initially by military and naval forces 
to improve communication security and minimize interference.131 Because 
different pairs of transmitters and receivers use different sequences of 
frequency selection, many communications can occur simultaneously on 
the same set of hopping frequencies without interfering with each other.  
FCC specifications for spread spectrum equipment, such as that used for 
Wi-Fi in the 2.4 GHz band, sets strict limits on transmitter power in order 
to reduce the potential for interference.  That, combined with the relatively 
short range of such transmitters at these frequencies, makes spread 
spectrum Wi-Fi extremely flexible, thus allowing dozens of homes in the 
same neighborhood to have their own Wi-Fi networks without interfering 
with each other.  For example, the 802.11g Wi-Fi standard uses spread 
spectrum modulation in the 2.4 GHz band and has a maximum net data rate 
of 54 megabits per second.132 
It is the case, however, that, as the number of transmitters and receivers 
increase attempting to use the same set of hopping frequencies, the potential for 
interference and reduced speed of communication transfer occurs.  Congestion 
also occurs when some of the signals have high bit rates, such as that required for 
video imagery.  In the microdrone context, using the same spectrum band for 
 
 128.   C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYSTEM TECH. J. 
379 (1948) available at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf. 
 129.   See Federal Communications Commission, Infrastructure (U-NII), Devices in the 5 
GHz Band, First Report and Order 3-14 (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/document/5- 
ghz-u-nii-ro (reviewing decisions allocating spectrum for WiFi). 
    130.   Spread Spectrum, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Spread_spectrum 
    131.     See ARRL Handbook, supra note 124, at 12.54 (explaining history of spread spectrum 
modulation). 
 132.   See Bradley Mitchell, Wireless Standards 802.11a, 802.11b/g/n, and 802.11ac: The 802.11 
Family Explained, ABOUT TECH http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/wireless80211/a/aa80211 
standard.htm (explaining specifications for different Wi-Fi standards). 
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video downlink as well as for the control link significantly increases the potential 
for interference, because the video signal has such a high information transfer 
rate, that it uses more of the available bandwidth and can occupy most or all of the 
spread spectrum hopping frequencies, thereby crowding out the control signal.  If 
GPS-based flight planning software is used to control drone position, the potential 
for interference increases further.  Accordingly, the better implementations put 
control-link signals and telemetry on one band, either 2.4 GHz or 5.8 GHz and 
video downlink signals on the other. 
 
iii.    Propagation 
 
Radio signals move through space differently depending on their frequency 
and wavelength.  Wavelength and frequency are inversely related: the higher the 
frequency, the smaller the wavelength.133 For example, a 7 MHz frequency has a 
wavelength of about 40 meters, and a 144 MHz signal has a wavelength of about 
2 meters.  Still higher frequencies have still shorter wavelengths; signals in the 
2.4 GHz band have a wavelength of 12.5 centimeters.134 
Propagation differences exist because the electromagnetic energy 
comprising radio signals interacts with the molecules in the earth and the 
atmosphere differently depending on their wavelengths.  Also, they interact 
differently depending on whether the molecules in the atmosphere are ionized, 
as they are in the ionosphere.135 
In general, and to oversimplify somewhat, very low frequency signals, 
such as those used to communicate with U.S. Navy submarines, penetrate the 
earth and are attenuated by the atmosphere.  Medium frequency signals, such 
as those used for the AM broadcast—515 to 1600 kHz—do not penetrate the 
earth well, but they travel further in the atmosphere and, at night, when 
ionization of the atmosphere is greater, they bounce off the ionosphere and are 
capable of greater range.  High-frequency signals, from 1.5 MHz to 30 MHz, 
bounce off the ionosphere at different levels depending on time of day and 
frequency.  This reflection produces a phenomenon known as “skip” which 
allows long-range global communication by these frequencies.  VHF signals, 
those from, 30 to about 200 MHz, and UHF signals, from 200 MHz to about 1 
GHz, penetrate the ionosphere and do not skip.  They are useful only for line of 
sight communication.  Above 1 GHz, the bottom of the microwave region, 
signals are useful for line of sight, but they are progressively attenuated by the 
atmosphere and precipitation in the atmosphere, with more attenuation as the 
frequency increases.  They also are more likely to be reflected by ground 
objects such as foliage, structures, and vehicles.136 
 
    133.    See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.1 (explaining fundamentals of radio waves). 
    134.    See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.2 (giving formulas for converting between 
frequency and waveleng; summarizing properties of different wavelengths). 
    135.    See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.2-21.6 (explaining how atmosphere interacts 
with radio waves to produce different propagation characteristics). 
    136.    See ARRL Handbook, supra note 121, at 21.4-21.6 (text box summarizing different 
propagation characteristics of different wavelengths). 
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Thus a 2.4 and 5.8 GHz signal are similar in their line of sight properties, 
but are different, in that the 5.8 GHz signal suffers more attenuation by the 
atmosphere and objects. 
 
4.    Weather 
 
Microdrone DROPs do not need the same level of understanding of 
weather phenomena as do manned aircraft pilots.  They fly their microdrones 
within the line of sight, mostly in daytime, and in low-wind conditions.  They 
do not need to understand specific flight planning weather products,137 because 
they can see for themselves how far they can fly their microdrones without 
losing sight of them because of obscuration or cloud cover.  They do not need 
to understand weather prognosis beyond what is available from general 
audience print and electronic media; they can see for themselves whether the 
latest forecast is proving correct. 
Their practical knowledge of what may make their vehicle uncontrollable 
will cause them not to attempt flight in adverse weather conditions.  The 
circumstances for manned aircraft flight are entirely different.  For one thing, 
they occur over ranges of dozens or hundreds of miles, where the weather is 
likely to be quite different from that at the takeoff point.  For another, manned 
aircraft pilots need to know the boundaries between visual flight rules 
(“VFR”)138 and IFR,139 so that they can operate only within the limitations of 
their aircraft and their pilot certificates.  Moreover, much of aviation using 
manned aircraft necessitates flying in an adverse weather conditions, in which 
pilots must know how to control the aircraft by reference to instruments only, 
must understand the complex system of air traffic control (ATC) IFR 
clearances,140 and must know how to avoid icing, turbulence, and thunderstorm 
activity even when they are legally operating under IFR in restricted visibility. 
 
5.    Automation 
 
Designing appropriate knowledge and skills requirements for automated 
cockpits is challenging the FAA.141 The automation of flight systems of man 
aircraft has accelerated greatly since the deployment of the first rudimentary 
autopilot in 1923.  Now, pilots of even the lowest level of general aviation 
aircraft routinely use multi-axis autopilots, and full “glass panel” displays, in 
which basic flight information such as airspeed, altitude, direction of flight, 
 
137.    FAA, Airman’s Information Manual 5-1-1. 
138.    14 C.F.R. §§ 91.151-91.161 (visual flight rules). 
139.    14 C.F.R. §§ 91.167-91.193 (instrument flight rules). 
140.    14 C.F.R. § 91.173 (requiring ATC clearances). 
141.    See Lane Wallace, Flight School: Glass Panel Training, FLYING (June 29, 2010), http://www. 
flyingmag.com/pilot-technique/new-pilots/flight-school-glass-panel-training (explaining differences in training 
for two types of cockpit displays). 
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aircraft pitch attitude, bank angles, and rates of turn, climb, and descent are 
displayed digitally on a screen, rather than by separate “steam gauges,” in which 
the same basic information was presented an analog form, usually by the 
position of a needle.142 
Glass panel instrumentation and the computers that drive them offer new 
capabilities that reduce pilot workload.  For example, a pilot flying an 
instrument approach can select the approach from a database stored in the 
system and fly it by hand with reference to a moving map display, or couple it 
to the autopilot and let the autopilot fly the airplane down to certain minimum 
altitudes. 
Because the systems reduce pilot workload and improve the accuracy with 
which navigation procedures can be executed, they potentially reduce risks.  On 
the other hand, there is growing recognition in the aviation community that cockpit 
automation also adds new risks.  First, overreliance on automation allows pilot 
skills related to manual flying to atrophy, or that a pilot confronted with a system 
anomaly or failure is less prepared to take over and maintain safe flight. 
Second, the systems themselves and their interfaces are complicated, 
typically involving dozens of menus arranged in hierarchies that are not always 
intuitive.  To make effective and safe use of such systems, pilots must be able 
quickly to change what is displayed on the screen, enter new data, and confirm 
its accuracy.  The number of choices and their accessibility on different menus 
easily can overwhelm a pilot who is not completely familiar with that 
particular system or in stressful situations, such as an emergency.  Fumbling 
with or misunderstanding automated flight control systems is what happened 
in the Asiana crash in San Francisco,143 and the Air France crash in the 
Atlantic Ocean.144 
The debate about how to change training, knowledge, and skills 
requirements to reduce risks of these types of accidents has not yet crystallized 
into regulations.  Some steps have been taken to require additional training of 
Airline Transport Pilot for aircraft upsets, emphasizing quick recognition of an 
unsafe condition such an incipient stall, and immediate appropriate responses.145 
Dealing with the problem of the human interface with highly automated 
systems, however, has been less comprehensive and robust, limited to a few 
changes in certification requirements for avionic systems.146 
 
    142.    See The Great Debate: are glass cockpits better?, AIR FACTS (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://airfactsjournal. com/2012/01/the-great-debate-are-glass-cockpits-better/ (online debate among pilots 
about merits of glass panel displays). 
    143.    BOARD MEETING: CRASH OF ASIANA FLIGHT 214 ACCIDENT REPORT SUMMARY, NAT’L. 
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB IDENTIFICATION: DCA13MA120 (June 24, 2014) available at 
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=20130707X83745&key=1&queryId=975ad
d42-dbf9-4b6d-a88a-8c2be55551d0& pgno=2&pgsize=50. 
 144.   See William Langewiesche, The Human Factor, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2014) (probing 
factors that caused Air France crash). 
 145.   14 C.F.R. § 61.156(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (2015) (requiring upset and stall recovery training). 
 146.   See VITA Technologies, DO-178C: Improved certification for cost-effective 
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One reason it is so difficult to develop appropriate training and testing 
requirements for automated cockpits is that the way in which information is 
displayed, and the way in which systems are controlled varies significantly 
between different commercial products.  Building specific product characteristics 
into governmentally imposed regulatory requirements limits competition and 
inhibits innovation.  This is a relatively new problem.  While the cockpit layouts 
differ significantly between an Airbus 340 and a Boeing 767, and those of a 
Diamond Twin Star differ significantly from those of a Mooney M20, the 
similarities are greater than the differences. The pilot has a stick, yoke, or 
joystick to control pitch and bank of the airplane, rudder pedals to control yaw, 
and some kind of throttle or fuel control lever to control thrust. 
The challenges for regulation related to cockpit automation are considerable, 
and aviation safety depends upon appropriate FAA and vendor responses. 
For microdrones, however, the problem is qualitatively different in two 
respects.  First, safe control of the aircraft depends entirely on the correct operation 
of automation systems.  For automatic hover, or autonomous return to home, no 
DROP input is involved.  The system does it entirely on its own, directly 
controlling the propulsion and control systems on the aircraft.  System 
malfunction is not something the DROP can correct for by manually flying the 
aircraft. 
Second, in some respects, autonomous control features reduce necessary 
DROP skills.  Hovering a helicopter is quite difficult for primary flight students.  
Usually they do not master it until eight or nine hours of flight instruction.  This is 
not the case with microdrones, especially those with autonomous hover capability.  
Onboard accelerometers, magnetometers, and GPS receivers and computers 
automatically send appropriate control inputs to the electric motors powering the 
rotors to keep the vehicle stationary over a particular point on the ground.  The 
DROP need do nothing; indeed, on the DJI Phantom and some of its competitors, 
automatic hover occurs whenever the DROP releases the controls altogether.147 
What this means for knowledge, skill, and training requirements is 
that (1) the DROP must be completely familiar with how the flight control 
systems work and how his inputs influence their operation; (2) he must 
know about the types of malfunctions that may occur, such as loss of a GPS 
signal, how the systems will respond, and whether he can provide any 
control input that will render the aircraft safe in such circumstances; (3) 
how inspections before and after flight can reduce the likelihood of system 
malfunction and (4) the need to be attentive to software and hardware 
upgrades provided by the vendor when he becomes aware of system 
 
avionics systems, http://vita.opensystemsmedia.com/articles/do-178c-certification-costeffective-
avionics-systems/ (explaining trends in certification of avionics systems). 
    147.    See DJI, PHANTOM 2 USER MANUAL V1.4 at 16 (2015) (explaining that vehicle automatically 
hovers when sticks are centered). 
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deficiencies.  These requirements are not altogether different for those  pilots 
of manned aircraft, but they involve different kinds of risks and different kinds 
of responses. 
 
6.    Drone Systems, with an Emphasis on Controls Links 
 
Microdrones are highly automated.  Unlike in an airplane or helicopter, 
control inputs by the operator do not directly move control surfaces, change 
pitch, or increase torque.  Instead, DROP control imports are fed through the 
computers on the control board, which combines them with sensor data about 
aircraft position, speed, and direction of flight and decides what adjustments 
should be made to motor current to implement the DROP commands.  A 
DROP, far more than a pilot, needs to understand the basic operation of the 
control systems on the microdrone. 
The DROP also must understand the steps to calibrate the magnetometer and 
the GPS navigation system before the microdrone is launched.  The magnetometer 
must learn which way is north, its orientation when it is level with respect to the 
earth, and its launching position so it knows where “home” is.  If the vehicle is not 
calibrated accurately before it is flown, it may be uncontrollable, and its return to 
home feature may take it to an unpredictable place.  
For the Phantom, GPS calibration involves ensuring that the vehicle is 
sitting level when power is applied and waiting until its lights flash in a 
particular pattern.  Magnetometer calibration involves picking the vehicle up 
and spinning it several directions until a different pattern of lights is complete.  
The calibration process differs from model to model, and the DROP must 
understand it for the particular model he is operating.148 
 
7.    Drone Emergency Procedures 
 
The emergency procedures that DROPs must understand are different 
from those that pilots must understand.  Pilots must understand how flight may 
be continued safely if an engine fails, through autorotation in a helicopter, and 
by maintaining a speed above stall speed in an airplane while it glides to a safe 
landing.149  DROPs do not need to know this because microdrones are 
unlikely to experience engine failures and, in any event, can neither glide 
nor autorotate.  Pilots need to understand the dangers of flying into weather 
conditions that reduce visibility; DROPs need not, they only need to 
understand the NPRM’s requirement that they fly only when visibility is 
good enough to maintain line of sight.150 
 
    148.      See e.g., DJI, PHANTOM 2 USER MANUAL V1.4 at 23 (2015) (specifying calibration process). 
 149.   See FAA, Private Pilot Practical Test Standards for Rotorcraft-Helicopter (July 
2005) (requiring demonstration of proficiency in autorotation). 
 150.   NPRM, supra note 2, at § 107.31 (limiting operations to line of sight). 
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DROPs do need to know how to deal with loss of the wireless control 
link and with battery exhaustion.151  Pilots do not need to know this because 
airplanes and helicopters have neither control links nor battery-powered 
propulsion systems. 
 
C.   Skills 
 
A baseline justification for any skills training and testing should be that that 
the student should be able to practice each knowledge element.  If a knowledge 
element is justifiable by its relationship to a discrete risk, it does little good 
unless a DROP can put it into practice.  If a bit of knowledge need not be 
practiced, it cannot be justified as a requirement. 
To satisfy skill requirements for certification, DROP candidates should be 
able to demonstrate that they consistently can keep the microdrone under control, 
make it go where they want it to, and avoid objects that might interfere with 
flight or the integrity of the control link, or suffer injury or damage.  As with any 
skill, proficiency requires practice.  The NPRM leaves the details of skills 
training and testing up to the institutional operator.152 
Based on the co-authors’ experience in flying airplanes and helicopters, on 
co-author Sprague’s experience giving flight instruction, on their experience in 
flying various models of microdrone, and advising others on flying them, a total 
of 10 hours seems the right level of experience.  Ten hours of total flight time 
equates to about 30 flights of a Phantom-class microdrone – more flights for one 
with less endurance.  That is surely enough to master procedures including 
calibration, operation of the automation features, keeping the drone in sight, 
and maintaining control of it.  Indeed, 30 supervised flights in an airplane or 
helicopter is about the level required of a private pilot candidate, because 
instructional and student solo flights usually take about an hour each. 
Beyond accumulating the requisite total flight time, DROP candidates 
should practice and demonstrate their skill at handling particular situations.  
They should be able to judge how high 500 feet above the ground is, and how far 
away 1000 feet is, without having to rely on telemetry from the microdrone.  
They should be able to maintain control of the microdrone regardless of which 
way it is pointing.  Later models of the Phantom and the Inspire have an 
operating mode that is indifferent to drone orientation with respect to the DROP, 
153but in case he flies a model without this feature, or the feature doesn’t work 
properly, he needs to be able to apply control imports as though he were aboard 
 
 151.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 79-80 (discussing mitigation of loss-of-control risk).  
 152.   NPRM, supra note 2 at 100-103 (explaining decision not to require skills testing and 
aeronautical experience). 
   153. See DJIPhantom, Intelligent Orientation Control (Apr. 21, 2015) http://www.djiphantom.co/ 
category/intelligent-orientation-control.html (explaining how Phantom can be configured to accept 
commands relative to DROP's position rather than relative to vehicle orientation). 
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the aircraft, facing in whatever direction the drone is pointing.  That might mean 
pushing the cyclic stick forward to cause of the drone to go to the DROP’s left, if 
the drone has yawed 90 degrees to the left, or pushing the cyclic forward to make 
the drone come back toward him if its nose has yawed 180 degrees. 
He also needs to demonstrate safe reactions if the drone flies behind an 
object obstructing his view of it.  He should show his proficiency in triggering 
return to home or disabling return to home if he wishes to regain manual control. 
He should practice and demonstrate mastery of various modes of flight and 
triggers for them, such as switching between attitude and GPS mode, setting 
height and range limitations, programming a flight plan on a map display and 
modifying it or interrupting it while the drone is executing the plan. 
When DROPs operate the camera as well as flying the drone, they should 
demonstrate proficiency in performing both tasks while remaining within line of 
sight and within altitude and distance limitations. 
 
D.   Observers 
 
The NPRM wisely omits the requirement, imposed in all the section 333 
exemptions, for an observer separate from the DROP.154 
The co-authors have flown as both pilots and copilots in several different 
types of airplanes and helicopters and have flown and observed flights of various 
models of microdrone.  In an airplane or helicopter, it is convenient to have a 
second pilot, or even a non-pilot passenger.  The second person can help keep a 
watch for potentially conflicting traffic, enter radio frequencies, activate flaps 
and other systems, and if properly qualified and upon request of the pilot take 
over the controls while the pilot performs a non-flying task such as shedding a 
jacket or entering navigational data. 
For microdrone flight, an observer performs no useful function—except 
keeping the DROP company.  If the DROP loses sight of the aircraft, the fact 
that the observer can still see it makes little difference.  It is not physically 
possible for two people to manipulate the controls on the small DROPCON used 
for microdrones.  It is difficult for a second person to get a clear view of the 
DROPCON screen without putting his head in the DROP’s way. 
 
VII.  A proposal for DROP certification 
 
A. Basic Requirements 
 
Requiring certification of DROPs provides a number of advantages.  It is a 
mechanism for delivering training and assuring a certain level of knowledge and 
skills that can improve safe operation of drones.  It permits the FAA to know 
 
 154.  NPRM, supra note 2, at 63 (discussing visual observer and emphasizing that none is 
required). 
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who is flying them.  It also gives the FAA leverage to enforce its regulations, 
because it gives the DROP an asset—his DROP certificate—that he must retain 
in order to keep flying.  Being able to take adverse action against a certificate 
holder who violates the rules puts the FAA in a much stronger enforcement 
position then if it must track down initially unknown violators and impose civil 
penalties against them. 
It is also true, however, that any form of certificate requirements imposes a 
barrier to entry by DROPs that does not now exist.  Thousands of individuals 
have purchased microdrones and are flying them, many undoubtedly for 
commercial purposes.  If they are not deterred by the FAA’s outright ban, they 
are unlikely to comply with a new requirement that they stop flying until they get 
DROP certificates.  Some of them will, but not all. 
This potential for widespread noncompliance is reduced by the NPRM’s 
certification strategy that adjusts the level of requirement for certification 
according to the level of drone to be flown under a particular class of certificate. 
The UAS America Fund, it its petition for rule making,155 presents a good idea: 
for very small microdrones, no significant training or testing would be 
required.156 
If more is thought to be necessary, DROPs could be required simply to 
register with the FAA or to take a short online quiz administered by the vendor.  
The quiz would not be difficult; it would be comparable to a typical driver’s 
license written test, designed to assure basic knowledge of the rules and of safe 
practices.  For heavier, more complex drones with higher performance in terms 
of range, altitude, speed, more knowledge and skills training and testing would 
be required.  At the high end, the requirements would be modeled on the 
requirements for manned aircraft pilot certificates, perhaps at the commercial 
level, but with content tailored to the risks involved in machodrone flight rather 
than those associated with airplane or helicopter flight. 
However DROP training, testing, and certification requirements are 
imposed, policy makers must determine the content of the requirements.  The 
following two subsections summarize the NPRM’s requirement for knowledge 
testing and take existing requirements for private-pilot skills and annotates them 
to make them suitable for DROP certification. 
 
 
 
 
 155.   Petition of UAS America Fund, LLC (“UAS Fund”) to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to Implement 
Operational Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.regulations. 
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-1087-0001 [hereinafter “UAS America Fund Petition”]. 
 156.   UAS America Fund Petition, supra note 155 at 14 (describing knowledge test proposal 
as only test requirement). 
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1.     Knowledge Requirements 
 
This subsection sets forth the black-letter knowledge requirements from the 
NPRM.  These requirements track the discussion of knowledge requirements in 
section 0 well. 
(1) Applicable regulations relating to small unmanned aircraft system 
rating privileges, limitations, and flight operation; 
(2) Airspace classification and operating requirements, obstacle 
clearance requirements, and flight restrictions affecting small unmanned 
aircraft operation; 
(3) Official sources of weather and effects of weather on small unmanned 
aircraft performance; 
(4) Small unmanned aircraft system loading and performance; 
(5) Emergency procedures; 
(6) Crew resource management; 
(7) Radio communication procedures; 
(8) Determining the performance of small unmanned aircraft; 
(9) Physiological effects of drugs and alcohol; 
(10) Aeronautical decision-making and judgment; and 
(11) Airport operations.157 
 
2. Skills Requirements 
 
This subsection takes the black-letter private-pilot flight proficiency 
requirements from 14 C.F.R. § 61.107 and annotates them to produce a set of 
skills requirements suitable for DROPs. 
(a) General. A person who applies for a private pilot  DROP 
certificate must receive and log ground and flight training from an 
authorized instructor on the areas of operation of this section that 
apply to the sUAS category and class rating sought. 
(b) Areas of operation.  
     (1) For an airplane category rating with a single-engine 
class rating: 
      (i) Preflight preparation; 
     (ii) Preflight procedures; 
    (iii) Airport and seaplane base operations; 
    (iv) Takeoffs, landings, and go-arounds hovering; 
     (v) Performance maneuvers: 
              Maintaining line of sight; 
             Maintaining control link; 
 
 157.   NPRM, supra note 2, at § 107.73 (Initial and recurrent knowledge tests). 
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            Maintaining attitude control despite sUAS   
orientation; 
           Flying from point-to-point; 
    (vi) Ground reference maneuvers; 
   (vii) Navigation; 
   (viii) Slow flight and stalls; 
         (ix) Basic instrument maneuvers; 
       (x) Emergency operations: 
             Loss of control link; 
            Battery exhaustion 
     (xi) Night operations, except as provided in §61.110 of 
this part; and 
    (xii) Postflight procedures. 
 
B. Training and Testing Infrastructure 
 
Responsibility for implementation any licensing program for DROPs 
requires infrastructure to implement it.  A considerable infrastructure already 
exists for manned aircraft flight training, and the NPRM adopts it for DROP 
knowledge testing,158 some parts of which could be adapted relatively easily to 
accommodate DROP training.  Some 500 flight schools exist in the United 
States accredited by the FAA under Part 141.159  Many more, almost one at 
every airport, operate without specific flight school designation and without 
detailed supervision of their curricular content and teaching methods.  Instead, 
their activities are governed by Part 61160 and Part 91.161  Part 61 prescribes the 
stages in training programs for different levels of pilot certificate, the content 
of ground instruction162, knowledge tests, 163 the content of flight training,164 
and – along with the FAA’s practical test standards documents165—the content 
of practical test checkride.166  CFIs have incentives to graduate a certain 
number of students who pass their knowledge and practical on the first 
 
 158.   NPRM, supra note 2, at 107-110 (explaining how DROP test will be administered). 
 159.   14 C.F.R. § 141 (2013). See http://av-info.faa.gov/PilotSchool.asp (listing accredited 
flight schools). 
 160.   14 C.F.R. § 61 (2013). 
 161.   14 C.F.R. § 91 (2015). 
 162.   14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a)-(b) (2013); 14 C.F.R. § 61.107(a)(b) (2013). 
 163.   14 C.F.R. § 61.35 (a) (2013). 
 164.   14 C.F.R. § 61.109(c) (2013). 
 165.   Federal Aviation Administration, https://www.faa.gov/training_ testing/testing/ test_standards/ 
(last visited March 22, 2015) (describing and making available practical test standards). 
 166.   14 C.F.R. § 61.43(a)-(f) (2013) (specifying content of checkout). 
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attempt.167  The knowledge tests themselves are designed by the FAA and its 
contractors and administered at designated private designated test centers.168 
Practical test check rides are administered mostly by DPEs,169 CFIs who 
have been selected by the FAA to represent the agency in this capacity and 
who exercise authority on behalf of the FAA administrator when they are 
giving the test.170 
One cannot simply assign DROP skills training and testing to this 
infrastructure, because its components have no experience with drones—and 
not necessarily any interest in training their operators.  A handful of flight  
schools are adding drone programs,171 as are several of the established 
aeronautical universities.172  Additionally, some universities not specializing in 
aviation have added DROP programs.173 
Before one can flesh out the infrastructure for DROP training two crucial 
personnel decisions must be made and the pipeline needs to fill in response to 
the decisions.  The first is: Who will be the instructors?  Existing CFI’s and 
ground instructors?  A new category of CFI and ground instructors?  Or will 
DROP training be the responsibility of someone else? 
Second, who will be the DROP examiners?  Existing DPEs or someone 
else?  It may be tempting simply to say that DROPS must take training—
whatever is prescribed—from currently certified CFIs, and that they must pass 
practical test rides administered by currently designated pilot examiners.  There 
are some advantages to using existing personnel; a part of their training and 
certification involves mastery of teaching techniques and national security 
screening.  The problem with that approach is that the current stock of CFIs and 
DPEs have no knowledge or experience with drones, and many of them have no 
interest in acquiring that knowledge and experience.  A CFI with a rotary wing 
rating is not authorized to give flight instruction in a fixed wing aircraft, and 
many have no interest in doing so.  The markets for rotary- and fixed-wing 
instruction are largely separate.  There’s no reason to think that the market for 
DROP instruction will be any less separate. 
The technical aspects of current CFI and DPE expertise, however, map 
poorly to DROP training, as the evaluation of existing pilot skills standards in 
section VII.A.2 makes clear. 
 
 167.   14 C.F.R. § 61.197(a)(2)(i) (2013) (CFI renewal based on student success rate). 
 168.   14 C.F.R. § 61.33 (2013) (describing test administration); Conduct of Airman Knowledge 
Tests, FAA, http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId =37E322DFC7FF65D68 52571AA00575D58 (last 
visited  Mar. 30, 2015) (describing private test centers). 
 169.   14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE). 
 170.   14 C.F.R. § 61.47 (2013) (describing DPE authority). 
 171.   See, e.g., Aviation, NORTHWESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, https://www.nmc.edu/ 
programs/academic-programs/aviation/index.html (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015). 
 172.   See, e.g., Daytona Beach Campus, EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY, 
http://daytonabeach.erau.edu/degrees/bachelor/unmanned-aircraft-systems-science/. 
 173.   See, e.g., Aviation, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA, http://aviation.und.edu/Prospective 
Students/Undergraduate/uasops.aspx. 
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An obvious alternative is to erect a system of manufacturer-run training.  
Drone manufacturers such as DJ I would set up their own network of DROP 
training schools.  There is no reason that cannot also train DROPs for other 
drone models as well; that would be left up to negotiation among vendors in the 
marketplace.  The advantage of this approach is that manufacturers know better 
than anyone else the characteristics of their flight vehicles and the details of their 
automatic systems.  They likely have their own test pilots who have experience 
with the vehicles rivaling anyone else’s. 
Two major disadvantages exist for this approach, however.  First, only the 
larger manufacturers would have the resources to do flight training effectively; 
yet the market is quite competitive and fragmented among many different 
designers and vendors.  Competition is healthy in any marketplace, and a 
training requirement that would tend to squeeze out the smaller players is not 
desirable policy. 
Second, even the larger vendors would be unlikely to set up DROP training 
academies at more than one or two locations.  Having to travel halfway across 
the country and make arrangements for lodging away from home would 
represent a significant barrier to DROP entry. 
Looking to private organizations for DROP skills certification activities is 
desirable because it opens up more possibilities for building a community of 
DROPs in which peer group pressure can reinforce safe practices and skill 
development, and because the private sector has greater flexibility in decision-
making, compared with governmental agencies. 
A number of models exist for this.  One of the most interesting is the 
Professional Association of Dive Instructors (“PADI”).  PADI emerged in 1966 
because of a perception by its founders that the existing organizations offering 
training and certification of scuba divers were poorly organized and not very 
effective.174  It has grown into an elaborate organization that offers diver 
certification at multiple levels.175  It is difficult for a diver to rent diving gear 
unless she can show a certificate of completion of at least the basic course.  
There is almost no governmental involvement; the market enforces the 
requirements, backed up by the possibility of liability and insurance requirements. 
There is no reason that a PADI-like organization cannot be erected for 
DROPs.  Similar to PADI, it would offer memberships, recruit instructors, 
administer training programs and standards for certifying them, and issue 
instructor certificates.  It would pair certified instructors with divers or would-
be divers.  It would develop tests that could be administered directly by 
instructors or online.  It would issue certificates of completion of various levels 
of instruction and testing. 
 
 174.   PADI History, PADI, http://www.padi.com/scuba-diving/about-padi/padi-history/ (last 
visited on Mar. 30, 2015). 
 175.  PADI Open Water Diver Course, PADI, http://www.padi.com/Scuba-Diving/padi-
courses/course-catalog/open-water-diver/ (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015). 
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Other models can be adapted from lifeguard certification—a process in 
most states administered by the nongovernmental Red Cross and backed up by 
hiring practices for lifeguards.176  Also helpful is young hunter, motorboat, 
snowmobile education and testing requirements in states like Illinois. Under 
these programs, the requirement for certification is expressed in statute and 
enforced by the state Department of Natural Resources, but mostly private 
instructors certified by the DNR conduct the training itself.177  In Illinois, 
young hunters may not obtain a hunting license unless the hunter successfully 
completes a hunter safety course approved by the Department of Natural 
Resources.178  The Illinois Department of Natural Resources administers four 
mandatory safety education courses, in boating, hunting, trapping, and 
snowmobiling.179  The hunting course comprises 10 hours of instruction and 
successful completion of a final exam.180  Course completion entitles the 
graduate to a Hunter Education Certificate of Competency.  
 The boating course is required before a person between the ages of 12 and 
18 can operate a motorboat.  It comprises 8 hours of instruction.  Like the 
hunting course, it can be completed online.  The snowmobile course is similar 
to the boating course, except that it is required for the age span 12-16.181 
 
C. American Association of Drone Instructors  
 
As section 0 and Seeking Law Abiding Drones182 explain, formal law is 
only part of the set of rules with which citizens comply.  Citizens also conform 
their conduct to other norms that they have been socialized to respect: for 
example, taking hats off inside, saying “please,” and “thank you,” offering to 
share the cost of a restaurant meal.  Professional and industry organizations adopt 
codes of good practice; some, as section VIII.B explains, providing training, 
testing, and certification programs. 
The most promising infrastructure for training, testing, and certification of 
microdrone and perhaps for machodrone DROPs as well, would be modeled on 
PADI, Red Cross lifeguard certification, and loosely on licensing of physicians and 
attorneys.  It would draw upon and strengthen the private center of gravity of 
manned aircraft pilot licensing, as well. 
 
 176.   Lifeguarding, AMERICAN RED CROSS, http://www.redcross.org/take-a-class/program-
highlights/lifeguarding (last visited on Mar. 30, 2015). 
   177.       ILLINOIS DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, SAFETY EDUCATION (2015) http://www.dnr.illinois. 
gov/safety/Pages/default.aspx (explaining certification programs for young hunters, archers, snowmobile 
and boating operators). 
 178.   520 ILCS 5/3.1-9; 3.2, (providing for certificate of competency by persons completing courses 
taught by Department personnel or “certified volunteer instructors”). 
 179.   Safety: Safety Education, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/ 
safety/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 180.   Safety: Hunter Safety, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/ safety/ 
Pages/HunterSafety.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 181.   Safety: Snowmobile Safety, ILL. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.dnr.illinois.gov/ 
safety/Pages/SnowmobileSafety.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
 182.  Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996). 
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Preparing DROPs for safe operation of microdrones would be the 
responsibility of a private association tentatively known as AADI—American 
Association of Drone Instructors.  AADI would be a private nonprofit 
membership organization organized under the laws of one or more states.  It 
would have four classes of members: DROP instructors, DROP candidates, 
qualified drops, and other interested persons. 
Its governing body, whether denominated Board of Directors or Board of 
Trustees, would be controlled by persons selected by the membership, but would 
also have representation from key stakeholders in the microdrone industry and 
the aviation community, including representatives of state and local government, 
manned aircraft pilots, the airlines, and general aviation organizations.  It might 
be chartered as a federal advisory committee to the FAA, although this is not 
necessary to its success. 
AADI would develop detailed curricula for DROP training, follow the 
NPRM specifications for DROP knowledge, develop skills standards, and would 
offer training materials in book and online form and practical test standards for 
DROP skills testing. 
Initially, AADI would recruit and qualify a cadre of DROP instructors.  At 
the beginning, CFIs would train DROP instructors, working from its curricula and 
training materials and test standards rather than from existing part 61 requirements 
for pilots.  As soon as a DROP instructor has been certified as satisfying the  
requirements, the responsibility for training DROPs would be shared between 
certified DROP instructors and CFI’s.  As soon as a DROP instructor has been 
certified, he would begin training DROP candidates.  No particular critical mass is 
necessary before training could begin. 
AADI would maintain a database of certifications.  Once a DROP 
instructor certifies a DROP candidate, the instructor would submit an online 
form that automatically would cause an entry to be made in the database.  AADI 
would periodically audit, on an essentially random basis the training and testing 
activities of its instructors. 
AADI also would maintain a database of drone complaints that could be 
filed by anyone on a standard but simple form that would identify time, place, 
and basic information such as the risk perceived by the reporting person or 
entity, and flight profiles such as height above the ground, speed, direction of 
flight, and proximity to other aircraft or to persons or property on the ground.  
Both the database of certified DROP instructors and DROPs and the database of 
complaints would be available to the public through AADI’s web site. 
Many private associations exist in the United States, and they attract widely 
varying degrees of attachment from their members.  Some—Aircraft Owner and 
Pilot’s Association (AOPA) might be a good example—are prominent advocates 
of the interests of their members, but do not have much gravitational pull 
psychologically.  Members pay dues to support AOPA’s lobbying and educational 
activities, but membership events do not occupy a prominent part of their lives; nor 
do they identify strongly with the organization.  Others, like many religious 
organizations, have strong bonds with their members.  Still others wax and wane 
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over their lives in the strength of attachment, while others, like American political 
parties, have some with weak attachment, for whom party membership is just a 
convenient way to label their political preferences, and others who are 
passionately involved in political campaigns, party caucuses, primaries and 
other organizational and candidate selection and platform writing activities. 
AADI would pursue a strategy that would place it at the higher end of 
member bonding.  This is necessary for several reasons.  First, AADI’s status and 
credibility must be such that it induces DROP candidates to participate in AADI’s 
training and testing activities and to seek AADI certification.  Second, members 
need to care enough about AADI as an umbrella for their professionalism for peer 
support, and AADI criteria must be credible enough that it is the primary reference 
point for good operating practices.  In other words AADI must be a community, 
whose members care about each other.  Third, suspension or revocation of AADI 
certification must matter, and loss of AADI membership must have consequences. 
AADI would offer coffee mugs, caps, bumper stickers, and pens with the 
AADI logo.  It would sponsor blogs for DROP instructors, certified DROPs, and 
DROP candidates on its website and be active in social media.  It also would 
sponsor live meetings around the country at which vendors and others could 
demonstrate new products and provide technical and marketing seminars. 
One way to assure these hallmarks of success is effective organization purely 
in the private sector.  PADI and the Red Cross (for its lifeguard certification), for 
example, do not enjoy any governmental imprimatur.  Even though no federal or 
state rules require SCUBA divers to get PADI certification, they do it anyway.  
One reason is that diving equipment rental enterprises view PADI certification is 
an easy way of assuring that the customer is unlikely to have an accident that 
would result, at least, in the loss of equipment, and might result in litigation and 
insurance claims.183 
No governmental imprimatur requires network engineers to have Microsoft 
or Cisco certification of their skills, but the operation of supply and demand in 
the labor market gives certificate holders a perceived advantage in hiring and 
advancement.184 
Alternatively, AADI could be linked more explicitly to regulatory 
requirements.  The linkage might be similar to that imposed by bar admissions 
agencies, usually specialized regulatory agencies exercising governmental power 
under the authority of a state’s highest court,185 and law schools.186  In most 
 
  183.  See PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DIVING INSTRUCTORS, WHY PADI, (2015) 
http://www.padi.com/scuba-diving/about-padi/why-choose-padi/ (explaining advantages of PADI 
certification). 
  184.       See MICROSOFT, THE ADVANTAGES OF OFFICIAL MICROSOFT AND CISCO CERTIFICATION 
TRAINING COURSES, (2015) https://social.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/4d8c5191-8db0-4d7c-accc-
99e83e8e0d16/the-advantages-of-official-microsoft-and-cisco-certification-training-
courses?forum=CertGeneral. 
 185.   See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (describing board of bar admissions 
appointed by state supreme court), http://www.state.il.us/ court/SupremeCourt/ Rules/Art_VII/ 
artVII.htm. 
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states, no one may take the bar exam or be admitted to the bar except upon proof 
of graduation from an accredited law school.187  The accreditation process for all 
schools is itself private. 
The FAA and state aviation authorities would require the possession of 
AADI certification to fly microdrone, just as Illinois requires possession of 
firearms or snowmobile certification, leaving the certification process almost 
entirely up to private entities. 
This degree of governmental involvement, while it may be necessary to 
reassure the public as to the integrity of the certification process, raises both 
delegation-doctrine and antitrust issues as when any private association exercises 
quasi-governmental authority.  Delegation-doctrine concerns could be satisfied in 
either one of two ways, or by a combination of both.  First, any governmental 
penalties for drone operations without AADI certification would be imposed only 
after a de-novo investigation, notice, and hearing by the governmental authority.  
The certification by AADI, or lack thereof would operate as a legal presumption in 
the adjudicatory enforcement proceeding.  AADI certification would be prima-
facie evidence of qualification; absence of certification would be prima-facie 
evidence of lack of qualification to operate the microdrone without violating the 
ban against reckless operation under the CFRs.188  But the respondent would be 
legally entitled to rebut the presumption that AADI certification was necessary. 
Under the second approach AADI would function and relate to its members 
as any private association would, free of governmental requirements or restraints, 
but the FAA would not impose governmental sanctions for violation of AADI 
rules themselves.  Instead, AADI would be constituted as a federal advisory 
committee, and the FAA would regularly take AADI standards and issue them as 
proposed FAA rules, followed by notice and comment rulemaking.  This is the 
process statutorily approved for negotiating rulemaking.189 
Under this approach, delegation-doctrine problems would be eliminated, 
because private organizations would not be making or enforcing rule via 
governmental power; the government would.  The obvious disadvantage is that 
the prospect of governmental adoption and codification of AADI rules and 
processes would devalue the AADI content unless and until it has been 
formally embraced by the FAA, and that process could take many months or 
years, depending on the level of controversy. 
 
 
 186.  See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 703(b) (eff. July 1, 1992) (requiring graduation from ABA-
approved lawschool), http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_VII/artVII.htm. 
 187.   Id. 
 188.   14 CFR § 91.13 (2014) (prohibiting careless and reckless operation). 
 189.   5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal 
Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1642-1647 (1986). 
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The antitrust strictures are more easily accommodated. In a series of cases, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Radiant Burner190 has been fleshed out in the 
context of many controversies over private standard-setting organizations.  The 
antitrust concern is that dominant firms in an industry would seize a standard-
setting organization and use its standards to exclude competitors.191 
To prevent this, the Radiant Burner case law,192 and several Justice 
Department safe-harbor guidelines193 require the following: (1) Open membership; 
(2) Transparency of standards development processes, and (3) Justification of the 
content of standards or rules adopted by the organization194 
The end result is not unlike that imposed by the Administrative Procedure 
Act on federal agencies; rulemaking must be rational, open for public input, 
explicitly justified in terms of logic and evidence.195  Adjudicatory procedures 
must offer the basic ingredients of a procedural due process.196 
To be sure, organizing and maintaining a private association, especially one 
intended significantly to affect member behavior, is challenging.197  But AADI’s 
organizers, mindful of the literature on organization viability, would embrace a 
strategy likely to achieve success. 
As section IV explains the government, through the FAA, could reinforce 
the viability of an organization like AADI, while avoiding delegation and 
antitrust problems by requiring that DROPs be a member of some organization 
and satisfy its certification requirements.  It would define the characteristics of 
the certifying organization without mandating membership in any particular one.  
This would allow the market to adapt and allow for new association entrants to 
innovate and improve on the services offered by existing organizations, much as 
PADI emerged when its founders believed they could do better than existing 
diver certification bodies. 
 
 190.   Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). 
 191.   Id. at 658. 
 192.   See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 
(1982); Allied Tube & Conduct Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988). 
 193.   See Hill B. Wellford, Antitrust Issues in Standard Setting, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222236.htm (March 29, 2007) (reviewing DOJ policy on 
standards setting organizations). 
 194.   See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 287 (explaining criteria for standard setting resulting from Radiant 
Burners and its progeny). 
 195.   See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Cape Code Hospital v. Sibelius, 630 F.3d 203, 211-212 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (vacating rule on Medicare reimbursement of hospitals because agency failed to give 
sufficient consideration to comments). 
 196.   See 5 U.S.C. § 556-557. 
 197.   See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (explaining social and economic dynamics that tend to undercut 
effective functioning of large groups). 
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Although the financial aspects of AADI are beyond the scope of this article, 
its financial viability would be assured by combination of membership fees, 
testing fees, certification fees, and charitable donations from interested parties. 
The AADI concept is useful regardless of shifting interpretations of the 
boundary between federal, state, and local control, depending on how 
preemption and commerce clause doctrines evolve in light of the fact that most 
microdrone flight has minimal effect on interstate commerce and that most of the 
safety and privacy concerns are strictly local. 
 
 
 
*** 
